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We find evidence for increased market transparency to have a positive effect on equity market 
liquidity. Using data from EU and US equity markets, we estimate the effect of the 
implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive to increase liquidity in EU 
stock markets. To measure different dimensions of market liquidity we use bid-ask spreads, 
the percentage daily range, the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio, the Market Efficiency Coefficient, 
trading volume and Amihud’s Illiquidity ratio. These metrics are used to measure the tightness, 
immediacy, breadth, resiliency, depth, and general liquidity of the market, respectively. We 
use a staggered Difference-in-Difference analysis to estimate an increase in all liquidity 
dimensions except immediacy, which decreases. This provides evidence for a positive 
relationship between market transparency and liquidity, but also suggests that the increase in 
some liquidity dimensions may come at the expense of others. However, for some of the 
liquidity metrics it is doubtful whether the parallel trends assumption holds, which limits the 
causal interpretation of these findings. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Although we do not provide a conclusive answer regarding the mechanisms through which 
transparency affects liquidity, we argue that the positive liquidity effects likely come as 
transparency lowers risk for price-setting market makers while also causing traders to change 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether market transparency impacts stock market 
liquidity. The relationship between these two attributes is ambiguous, as previous research has 
suggested that transparency can both increase (Boehmer, Saar, & Yu, 2005; Pagano & Röell, 
1996) and decrease (Bloomfield & O'Hara, 1999; Madhavan, Porter, & Weaver, 2005) 
liquidity. Furthermore, other researchers have found no significant effect (Gemmill, 1996). 
This thesis will analyze the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) as a “shock” to transparency and measure its effect on stock market liquidity. We 
will perform a comparative analysis by using the largest stocks in the EU and the US, 
respectively. This analysis will be performed on two portfolios before and after the official 
implementation date, which is November 1
st
, 2007 (European Commission, 2006).  
Many of the theorems in finance rely on the assumption that markets are frictionless, and that 
no single order can impact the market price. Furthermore, many equilibrium asset pricing 
models do not account for the trading process through which equilibrium is reached, as well 
as the frictions that may impact price formation (Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2001). 
However, in real life liquidity is essential for a well-functioning market, as a liquid market 
allows buyers and sellers to find each other and agree upon a fair price quickly. As such, a 
liquid market increases market efficiency through improved allocation of economic resources 
(Sarr & Lybek, 2002). Furthermore, shocks to liquidity supply in financial markets have 
shown that market liquidity may directly impact real economic activity (Goldberg, 2015). As 
of late, concerns about liquidity “drying up” in financial markets have sparked debate about 
their stability and the possible increased vulnerability of markets to crises (PwC, 2015). As 
regulators are focused on improving liquidity conditions in financial markets, it is interesting 
to examine whether the regulations introduced have the intended effect.  
A key goal of MiFID is the creation of deep and liquid capital markets (HM Treasury, 2007). 
Within the directive, there is a considerable focus on increasing transparency in European 
financial markets. However, the theoretical and empirical literature examining the effect of 
market transparency on liquidity is divided, where the theoretical literature largely suggests 
that transparency should matter for liquidity while the empirical literature is mixed 
(Bloomfield & O'Hara, 1999). This implies that there is considerable uncertainty about what 
effects increased transparency will have on the market, with researchers suggesting that it may 
both increase (Boehmer, Saar, & Yu, 2005; Pagano & Röell, 1996) and decrease (Bloomfield 
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& O'Hara, 1999; Madhavan, Porter, & Weaver, 2005) liquidity.  Furthermore, new regulatory 
regimes tend to build on existing regimes, as the introduction of MiFID II demonstrates. It is 
therefore important to analyze and understand the effects of increased transparency to provide 
guidance for future regulations. This is highly relevant today, as the advent of Brexit has 
sparked debate about a potential “MiFID III” (Ricketts & Agini , 2019).  These considerations 
are the motivation behind the chosen research topic for this thesis: How does market 
transparency affect stock market liquidity? 
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2. Literature Review 
This section of the thesis will discuss central topics for the research question, namely what 
liquidity is, what determines the liquidity of a market and how transparency relates to liquidity. 
In addition, this section will provide an overview of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID). MiFID is a broad and complex directive, and we will thus present a general 
overview in addition to the relevant parts of the directive. The literature review forms the basis 
for our research topic, which is presented in the last subsection. 
2.1 Market Liquidity 
Despite being the focus of both regulators and researchers, liquidity is not easily defined. 
According to Amihud et al. (2012, p. ix) liquid markets are characterized by the ability to 
transact large quantities of securities quickly and at a low cost. Cooper et al. (1985) define 
liquidity as “the relationship between volume of trading and changes in market price”. 
Foucault et al. (2013, p. 8) define liquidity as “the ability to trade a security quickly at a price 
close to its consensus value”. These definitions are somewhat overlapping and highlight 
different aspects of liquidity. The first definition implies that liquid markets have high trading 
volume and trading activity allowing for large orders to be disseminated quickly, and that fees 
and other trading costs are low. The second suggests that in a liquid market, orders should 
have minimal price impact. The last definition implies that in a liquid market, transactions take 
place at a price close to the agreed fair value of the security.  
Sarr and Lybek (2002) present five distinct characteristics of a liquid market; tightness, 
immediacy, depth, breadth and resiliency. Tightness refers to transaction costs such as the bid-
ask spread, which are low in a liquid market. Immediacy is order execution speed, reflecting 
the efficiency of trading, clearing and settlement systems. Depth describes the abundancy of 
orders present above and below the current trading price. Breadth is the market’s ability to 
absorb large and numerous orders with minimal price impact. Resiliency describes the 
market’s ability to quickly correct mispricing that occurs when order imbalances temporarily 
push prices away from the fundamental value. 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002), a liquid market offers improved allocation and 
informational efficiency compared to a less liquid market, making liquidity a desirable trait 
for financial markets. However, the relationship between liquidity and informational 
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efficiency is ambiguous. Bernstein (1987) argues that there is a trade-off between liquidity 
and efficiency, as a less liquid market may move more rapidly to reflect new information as it 
arrives. Regulators’ focus on increasing market liquidity suggests that greater liquidity is a net 
positive for the functioning of financial markets. To fully understand why and how liquidity 
matters, it is beneficial to examine what implications it has for different market participants. 
This will be discussed in the following paragraph. 
From the definitions of liquidity presented above, one can easily deduct that market liquidity 
is important. But the diversity of definitions also suggests that it is important for different 
market participants for different reasons. For institutional investors, as well as large individual 
investors, liquidity is important as it allows them to buy and sell large blocks of stock without 
inducing an unacceptably large price movement (Cooper, Groth, & Avera, 1985). 
Furthermore, liquid markets have lower transaction costs (Hasbrouck & Schwartz, 1988), 
allowing traders to buy and sell at lower costs. For firms, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Jacoby et al. (2000) find that the liquidity of their stock affects their cost of capital, as investors 
require higher yields on less liquid stocks. Thus, firms have an incentive to increase the 
liquidity of their stock to reduce their cost of capital (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). Their 
findings also suggest a positive relationship between stock liquidity and firm value. According 
to Brau and Fawcett (2006), the liquidity offered in secondary markets is an important reason 
for firms to go public. They also find that the main purpose of equity offerings is to finance 
future acquisitions. It follows that market liquidity has important implications for firms’ 
financing decisions. Furthermore, the liquidity of secondary markets impacts firms’ choice of 
underwriters, where CEOs who value liquidity are more likely to hire prestigious underwriters 
(Mantecon & Poon, 2009). Thus, liquidity is important not only for the firm issuing stock and 
those who subsequently trade it, but also for the intermediaries who facilitate the issuance. 
2.2 Determinants of Market Liquidity 
As liquidity is multifaceted, there are many factors that determine the liquidity of a market. 
Arbel et al. (1983) and Merton (1987) suggest that firms with larger market capitalization 
garner more attention from analysts and investors. This implies a “size effect” where the stocks 
of large companies will display greater liquidity than those of smaller companies. The findings 
of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) support the existence of a negative relationship between 
firm size and the bid-ask spread. This implies that larger-capitalization stocks will be more 
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liquid as measured by market tightness. Furthermore, Apergis et al. (2015) find that during 
times of economic uncertainty, investors tend to reallocate capital from less liquid small-
capitalization stocks to more liquid large-capitalization stocks. This “flight-to-quality” effect 
indicates that stock liquidity may be self-reinforcing during times of uncertainty, thus 
magnifying the size effect. 
In addition to firm size, the “age” of a firm as measured by time since IPO seems to be an 
important determinant of trading activity. Booth and Chua (1996) argue that issuers have an 
incentive to underprice IPOs to attract broad initial ownership, thereby increasing secondary 
market liquidity. This suggests that newly listed firms may display greater liquidity than more 
established firms. However, the empirical literature is conflicted about the relationship 
between “age” and liquidity. Chordia et al. (2007) find that young firms experience greater 
trading activity, supporting the theory presented by Booth and Chua (1996). However, 
Camilleri and Galea (2019) find that in most cases, younger firms are less actively traded than 
more established firms. Despite the divergence in the literature as to what effect firm “age” 
may have, both find this characteristic to be a significant determinant of liquidity. It is 
therefore pertinent to include this characteristic when analyzing stock liquidity.  
In addition to the market capitalization and “age” characteristics, there are many firm-specific 
determinants that on surface level may seem important for liquidity. Camilleri and Galea 
(2019) provide a comprehensive study of determinants of stock trading activity. They estimate 
a model of liquidity based on five possible trading activity determinants, namely market 
capitalization, dividend yield, earnings yield, company growth rate and established versus 
recently listed firms. They find market capitalization and established versus recently listed 
firms to be significant determinants, where market capitalization was found to be the most 
important determinant. Earnings yield, dividend yield and company growth rate were found 
to not be important determinants of trading activity (Camilleri & Galea, 2019). 
As previously mentioned, liquid markets display the ability to disseminate large orders 
cheaply. This implies that measurements based on trading costs, volume and price impact of 
trades can all provide proxy measurements for liquidity. According to Hasbrouck and 
Schwartz (1988), liquidity measures based on trading costs capture execution cost, meaning 
the implicit costs of trading an asset quickly. Measures based on trading volume may include 
either the outright number of securities traded, or more sophisticated measures such as 
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turnover rates that capture the average number of times each security has changed hands (Sarr 
& Lybek, 2002).   
2.3 Transparency and Liquidity 
This section supplements the previous section by exploring market transparency as another 
possible determinant of liquidity. Before pursuing this question, it is pertinent to define market 
transparency. Madhavan et al. (2005) define market transparency as “the ability of market 
participants to observe information about the trading process”. Pagano and Röell (1996) 
suggest a similar definition of transparency as “the degree to which the size and direction of 
the current order flow are visible to the competing market makers involved in setting prices”. 
They further distinguish between two forms of market transparency, namely pre- and post-
trade transparency. They define pre-trade transparency as “visibility of the best price at which 
any incoming order can be executed”, and post-trade transparency as “public visibility of 
recent trading history”. Foucault et al. (2013, p. 280) elaborate on the definition of pre-trade 
transparency by specifying three forms of pre-trade transparency, namely visibility of quotes, 
visibility of incoming orders and visibility of traders’ identities. Based on this, this thesis will 
use a general definition of transparency as the degree to which market participants can observe 
information about quotes as well as the size, direction, and origin of current and past order 
flow. This definition is meant to cover both pre- and post-trade transparency as defined by 
Pagano and Röell (1996), and thus their definitions as well as the definition by Foucault et al. 
(2013, p. 280) will be relied upon when it is necessary to be more specific about the type of 
transparency discussed. 
Theoretical and empirical research into the relationship between transparency and liquidity 
has yielded different results. Some studies have found that transparency positively impacts 
liquidity because it reduces the risk for market makers, thereby allowing them to offer 
narrower spreads to compete for orders (Pagano & Röell, 1996). Others have found 
transparency to increase liquidity because traders adapt their strategies to place smaller orders 
and cancel orders faster, thus reducing the orders’ price impact (Boehmer, Saar, & Yu, 2005). 
However, others have found that transparency reduces liquidity by making it easier for market 
makers to access order flow data to gain information about market fundamentals, and thus 
they have less incentive to compete for order flow themselves (Bloomfield & O'Hara, 1999). 
Some studies have also found that transparency reduces liquidity, as the cancellation of orders 
 15 
by limit order traders reduces market depth and thus increases the price impact of orders 
(Madhavan, Porter, & Weaver, 2005).  
Pagano and Röell (1996) find that greater market transparency improves liquidity, as a more 
transparent market offers lower average trading costs for liquidity traders. According to the 
authors, a transparent market allows the market makers to make more precise inferences about 
whether orders are information- or liquidity-driven. This allows market makers to better 
protect themselves against losses to informed traders, allowing them to offer narrower spreads 
and thereby lower trading costs to uninformed traders (Pagano & Röell, 1996). The authors 
argue that due to competition with other market makers, each market maker has incentives to 
lower trading costs as they compete for order flow. Although the authors emphasize that the 
reduction in trading costs may not apply to all order sizes, they find that in all cases analyzed, 
the average trading costs for uninformed traders decrease in a more transparent market. Based 
on their findings, Pagano and Röell (1996) suggest that policy makers wishing to reduce 
trading costs for uninformed traders should ensure that order flow is publicly disseminated as 
quickly as possible, and that information from inter-dealer networks is made more widely 
accessible to market participants. According to the authors, this favors centralized electronic 
execution systems with automatic and real-time reporting and publication. Furthermore, they 
argue, exchanges should either be consolidated to one centralized exchange or integrated into 
a network subject to tight publication requirements.   
The idea that transparency increases liquidity is empirically supported by the findings of 
Boehmer et al. (2005). They find that making the limit order book public on the New York 
Stock Exchange, thereby increasing pre-trade transparency, lead to traders changing their 
strategies to manage their limit-order exposure. More specifically, they find that traders submit 
smaller orders and cancel orders faster. According to the authors, this reduction in order size 
lessened the price impact of orders, thus reducing the compensation for liquidity provision 
offered to market makers such as specialists, as well as limit-order suppliers. Furthermore, 
they find that without privileged information about the order book, floor brokers and 
specialists reduced their activity as they were crowded out by increased activity from traders 
using electronically submitted limit orders.   
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However, other researchers have found that increased transparency may have the opposite 
effect. In a report published by London Economics (2010), they argue that “greater 
transparency may lead to losses among limit-order providers to momentum traders, which 
would cause a reduction in market depth”. This is similar to the findings of Boehmer et al. 
(2005), who also find that limit-order suppliers may experience a loss of profit due to increased 
transparency. Boehmer et al. (2005) argue that the loss of profit for liquidity providers happens 
as increased transparency deepens the order book, which ultimately lowers spreads and 
thereby the compensation for liquidity provision. These differing conclusions about the net 
effect on market depth suggest that the effect of increased transparency on different aspects of 
liquidity may be ambiguous.  
The argument that transparency may have an adverse effect on liquidity is supported by studies 
performed by Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000). They find that greater transparency in the form 
of trade disclosure cause transaction prices to converge more rapidly, thereby increasing their 
informational efficiency. This supports the view purported by Sarr and Lybek (2002). 
However, in contrast to the theory presented by Pagano and Röell (1996), Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999) find that increased informational efficiency reduces market makers’ incentive 
to compete for order flow, causing spreads to widen as transparency increases. The authors 
argue that in a less transparent market, the market maker will gain valuable information about 
market fundamentals from the order flow attracted by narrow spreads. In a transparent market, 
however, this information is publicly disseminated and thus the market maker has less 
incentive to attract order flow (Bloomfield & O'Hara, 1999).  
Madhavan et al. (2005) find that making the limit order book public, thus increasing pre-trade 
transparency, lead to higher execution costs and greater price volatility on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange. This indicates that market transparency may reduce liquidity. Like Boehmer et al. 
(2005), the findings of Madhavan et al. (2005) are consistent with the theory that traders adjust 
their trading strategies as a response to the level of transparency. However, Madhavan et al. 
(2005) conclude that the withdrawal of orders by limit-order providers will reduce market 
depth. They argue that the thinner limit order book will cause the order flow to have greater 
price impact, thus increasing volatility and execution costs.  
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As this section has revealed, research into the relationship between transparency and liquidity 
has yielded diverging results. This is also suggested by Gemmill (1996), who find that 
changing the level of post-trade transparency on the London Stock Exchange did not 
significantly affect liquidity, further indicating that the relationship between market 
transparency and liquidity is not clear-cut. The considerable attention given to market 
transparency in MiFID exemplifies the focus dedicated by regulators to this issue. However, 
without a clear answer to what effect greater transparency may have on the market, regulations 
may not have the intended effect. In the worst-case scenario, such regulations may have 
considerable adverse effects on financial markets. The following section provides an overview 
of MiFID before discussing these potential issues. 
2.4 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) came into force on November 1
st
, 
2007 with the goal of providing a harmonized set of rules governing markets and investment 
services in the European Union (European Commission, 2006). The new regulation replaced 
the Investment Services Directive (ISD), aiming to address multiple issues with its 
predecessor. ISD had proven ineffective in promoting business between countries in the 
European single market, while also failing to cover several activities such as investment advice 
and derivatives trading (HM Treasury, 2007). Furthermore, the ISD allowed countries to limit 
which trading venues orders could be routed to (London Economics, 2010), possibly limiting 
competition between venues. 
The ISD’s “concentration rule” allowed EU member countries to require all retail orders be 
executed on a regulated market (London Economics, 2010). Naturally, such rules may impede 
competition between trading venues, as alternative trading venues may not be allowed to 
compete with regulated markets. As discussed previously, Pagano and Röell (1996) and 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) suggest that competition between market makers lowers 
spreads, as they are incentivized to offer competitive spreads to attract order flow. By 
extension, if market makers on regulated exchanges face less competition from alternative 
venues, they may have less incentive to provide the best possible spread. Higher trading costs 
would imply lower liquidity as measured by market tightness.  
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To facilitate greater competition, MiFID removed the concentration rule, thus enabling other 
platforms to compete with regulated markets (London Economics, 2010). More specifically, 
MiFID defines three distinct infrastructures through which trading may take place. A regulated 
market (RM) is a multilateral system bringing together third-party buyers and sellers of a 
financial instrument. The RM is operated by a market operator who facilitates trade between 
buyers and sellers in a non-discretionary manner. The market operator thus acts as a neutral 
intermediary. A Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) operates in much the same way as an 
RM, facilitating multilateral trade between third-party buyers and sellers. They provide an 
alternative to the RM and may be operated by an investment firm. In addition to the RM and 
MTF, trading may take place with a systematic internalizer (SI). The SI is an investment firm 
that deals on its own account by executing client orders outside a RM or an MTF. Unlike the 
RM and MTF, the SI is not an intermediary, but executes the orders by trading directly with 
the clients as the counterparty in the transaction. By removing the concentration rule, MTF´s 
and SI´s are allowed to compete with RM´s across the EU, including countries where such 
competition may previously have been restricted. 
In addition to changing the competitive environment, MiFID sought to bolster transparency 
requirements “with the two-fold aim of protecting investors and ensuring the smooth operation 
of securities markets” (European Commission, 2004, p. 5). The changes to market 
transparency are meant to be symbiotic with the changes in the competitive environment, 
which is apparent from Article I (34) of the directive: 
“ 
Fair competition requires that market participants and investors be able to compare the prices 
that trading venues (i.e. regulated markets, MTFs and intermediaries) are required to publish. 
To this end, it is recommended that Member States remove any obstacles which may prevent 
the consolidation at European level of the relevant information and its publication. (European 
Commission, 2004, p. 4) 
“ 
This highlights the connection between transparency and competition: By ensuring visibility 
of quotes, which is an aspect of pre-trade transparency, and making such information easily 
available and comparable, the directive aims to foster competition between trading venues. 
The European Commission (2004) further specifies pre-trade transparency requirements for 
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each of the trading venues that comprise the market infrastructure. SI’s are required to publish 
quotes for those stocks that trade on an RM, while for those stocks not trading on a liquid 
market, they are required to disclose quotes to clients on request (2004, p. 22). For MTF’s and 
RM’s, MiFID requires that current bid and offer prices as well as the depth of trading interest 
at those prices is “made available to the public on reasonable commercial terms and on a 
continuous basis during normal trading hours” (European Commission, 2004). MiFID also 
outlines post-trade transparency requirements for each of the trading venues. SI’s are required 
to publicize the volume, price, and timestamps of their transactions “as close to real-time as 
possible, on a reasonable commercial basis, and in a manner which is easily accessible to other 
market participants” (European Commission, 2004, p. 23). MTF’s and RM’s are also required 
to make public the volume, price and timestamps of transactions in stocks admitted to their 
platform, on “a reasonable commercial basis” and “as close to real-time as possible” 
(European Commission, 2004).  
2.5 Thesis Question and Hypotheses 
A key goal of MiFID is the creation of deep and liquid capital markets (HM Treasury, 2007). 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the transparency requirements outlined in the directive 
seek to aid the creation of such markets. The introduction of requirements to publicize 
information from the order book such as bids and offers, volume and depth of interest 
resembles the case studied by Boehmer et al. (2005). Consequently, one may expect an 
increase in market liquidity following the implementation. However, an equally similar case 
is that studied by Madhavan et al. (2005). Their findings, when applied to the case of MiFID, 
suggest that the comprehensive transparency regime introduced by the directive may in fact 
have the opposite effect. If so, the directive may reduce liquidity in the form of increased 
transaction costs and reduced market depth. Furthermore, when applying the findings of 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), the increase in post-trade transparency may improve 
informational efficiency but at the expense of transactional efficiency. If so, the post-trade 
disclosure requirements may increase transaction costs. This considerable uncertainty about 
the effects of transparency on liquidity, and by extension the effects of MiFID on liquidity, 
has motivated the research question that this thesis seeks to answer:  
 
How does market transparency affect stock market liquidity? 
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It is evident from the literature review that there are several mechanisms through which 
transparency may affect liquidity. When examining these mechanisms, the research tends to 
focus on different market participants, namely individual and institutional traders or market 
makers and trading venues. To supplement the thesis question, we will therefore present 
several hypotheses about why we may observe an effect on liquidity through the lens of 
different market participants.  
2.5.1 Market Makers and Trading Venues 
Firstly, transparency may affect liquidity through influencing the behavior of market makers 
and trading venues. As the literature review reveals, this effect may be either negative or 
positive. In line with Pagano and Röell (1996), liquidity may increase as market makers face 
reduced risk of losses to informed traders. As market makers compete for order flow, the 
reduced cost may be captured by uninformed traders as market makers narrow their spreads 
to remain competitive. If so, we are likely to observe increased tightness from lower trading 
costs. The lower spread implies less price impact for orders as the incremental change in 
market price caused by market orders executed at the bid or ask is reduced. Lower trading 
costs are likely to attract more traders, and market depth and resiliency is therefore likely to 
increase. The effect on immediacy is unclear, but it will either remain unchanged or increase 
due to increased depth. Breadth may increase due to more numerous orders from uninformed 
traders, while the size of orders may either increase due to smaller price impact or decrease 
due to lower profits for informed traders from trading with market makers. As such, breadth 
is likely to remain unchanged or increase. The net effect of these factors is an increase in 
liquidity. This hypothesis will be referred to as the “Market Maker Competition Hypothesis”. 
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However, as Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) suggest, transparency may also induce market 
maker behavior that reduces liquidity. More specifically, public dissemination of order flow 
information reduces the informational advantage for market makers from trading with market 
participants. As such, they may be more inclined to freeload on order flow information from 
other market makers or trading venues rather than attract their own order flow through 
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narrowing spreads. If so, we are likely to observe a reduction in tightness from increased 
transaction costs. However, as per the findings of Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), prices are 
likely to converge faster in this setting, implying an increase in resiliency. Due to higher 
transaction costs, the price impact of orders is likely to increase while market depth is likely 
to decrease. Furthermore, higher transaction costs may discourage small traders, while the 
informational edge of informed traders is likely to decrease or remain unchanged. As such, 
market breadth is likely to decrease. The effect on immediacy is unclear, but the net effect of 
these factors is a decrease in liquidity. This hypothesis will be referred to as the “Market Maker 
Freeloading Hypothesis”.  
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2.5.2 Individual and Institutional Traders 
Secondly, transparency may affect the behavior and strategies of individual and institutional 
traders, thereby affecting liquidity.  The mechanisms behind our two trader-focused 
hypotheses are similar, but with two different implications. Both hypotheses state that 
increased transparency will reduce profits for limit order traders, making traders adapt their 
strategies to reduce limit-order exposure by submitting smaller orders and withdrawing orders 
quicker. In line with Madhavan et al. (2005), the first hypothesis is that this will lead to reduced 
depth, and by extension larger price impact. This implies a loss of resiliency and increased 
trading costs. The effect on breadth will either be negative or unchanged, as orders are smaller 
but may not be less numerous. In total, this will lead to reduced market liquidity. This 
hypothesis will be referred to as the “Limit Order Aversion Hypothesis”. 
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The second trader-focused hypothesis is based on the same mechanism outlined in the previous 
paragraph. However, in line with Boehmer et al. (2005), the last hypothesis states that the 
reduction in order size will lessen their price impact, and by extension reduce the 
compensation for liquidity suppliers. This implies increased resiliency and tightness. The 
reduction in price impact of orders is also likely to increase depth, as found by Boehmer et al. 
(2005).  The impact on breadth is unclear but is likely to either remain unchanged or increase 
in line with the increased depth. In total, this implies an increase in market liquidity. This 




Although there are four distinct hypotheses, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
hypotheses focus on two groups of market participants, namely market makers and traders. It 
is possible that both traders and market makers are affected by a change in market 
transparency. If so, it is likely that each group will have its own response to the change, and 
thus any liquidity effects observed may be a result of a combination of market maker and 
trader mechanisms. It is also possible that participants within the two groups have different 
responses. However, it is likely that one response will be more optimal for the group on 
aggregate, and thus any effects found in our analysis is likely to stem from the dominant 
mechanism. In summary, we expect any effects on liquidity to be explained by of one of the 
hypotheses, or a combination of one market maker hypothesis and one trader hypothesis.  
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses with the corresponding liquidity effects. These effects will 
be used to identify two main findings for this thesis, namely how increased transparency 
affects stock market liquidity and through which mechanism this effect occurs. 
 
 
Table 1: Sub-hypotheses 
This table summarizes the dimension-specific liquidity effects for the four presented 
hypotheses. We will thus be using this table as the reference for interpreting the empirical 
results.   
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Liquidity Dimension MM Competition MM Freeloading Trader Adaption LO Aversion
Tightness + - + +
Immediacy ?/+ ? ? ?
Breadth =/+ - =/+ =/-
Depth + - + -
Resiliency + + + -
Net Liquidity Effect Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
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3. Methodology 
In this section of the thesis, we will present the different empirical methods for measuring the 
effect of MiFID on stock market liquidity. When performing the initial analysis, we will be 
using standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. In order to test for causality, we will 
be using the difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis.  
3.1 Standard Ordinary Least Squares 
For our initial analysis, we will be performing multiple regressions on different liquidity 
metrics by using the OLS method. The multiple regression model extends the simple 
regression model by including several control variables. As the literature review shows, there 
are several determinants of market liquidity. Thus, several explanatory variables will be 
included to reduce the omitted variables bias. The OLS is performed upon a timeframe of 6 
months pre and post implementation.  
The OLS estimator seeks to minimize the error between the fitted values and the observed 
values (3.1). More specifically, this is done by minimizing the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) 
(Buse, Ganea, & Circiumaru, 2021). The results from this model (3.1) alone, does not return 
a causal interpretation (Akramov, 2015).  
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3.1.1 Interpretation of OLS Regressions 
As presented in section 2, we will be using a combination of five liquidity dimensions to 
capture the mechanism and liquidity effect through the four hypotheses. The estimated 
coefficients from the OLS regressions indicate whether the specific liquidity dimensions 
experience a change. Hence, by evaluating the sign of the coefficient together with the 
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significance level, we will be able to evaluate whether the presented hypotheses can be 
considered as rejected. 
3.2 Difference-in-Difference Method 
The empirical study of this thesis seeks to determine the effect of transparency on liquidity by 
examining the introduction of MiFID. Hence, we are evaluating the possible changes before 
and after the directive´s implementation. The DiD is the most frequently used method in 
impact evaluation studies (Fredriksson & Magalhaes, 2019). This method compares two time 
periods, pre and post, and two groups, treatment and control. This is done by comparing two 
groups of dependent variables that have similar trends before the treatment. While the former 
group receives the treatment and the latter does not, the difference in the trends after the 
treatment is used to draw conclusions about the effect of the treatment (Peterson, 1989).  In 
this thesis, we will be using the DiD model to evaluate whether the stock market liquidity in 
the EU has changed after the implementation of MiFID, compared to the US where MiFID 
was not introduced.  
In order to determine causalities, we will have to eliminate the confounding effects from other 
variables (Fredriksson & Magalhaes, 2019). This includes eliminating the effects from non-
included explanatory variables to isolate transparency´s impact on stock market liquidity. This 
effect is visible when the difference between the pre and post population is caused by the 
treatment. However, a simple OLS regression using MiFID as a dummy variable to measure 
the pre and post liquidity is unlikely to account for the unbundling effects from omitted 
variables (Leigtner, 2012). In addition, it is reasonable to believe that there are differences in 
the level of liquidity between the EU and US markets. The DiD model measures the changes 
after the treatment rather than the absolute levels and is thus an appropriate model for 
measuring changes in liquidity after the implementation of MiFID.  
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Figure 1: Difference-in-Difference Model 
This figure visualizes the Difference-in-Difference Model. The treatment and control group 
are defined by the difference in color while the pre and post groups can be defined by the 
dashed line. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
In order to evaluate whether stock market liquidity has increased, we will be performing the 
DiD analysis on different liquidity measures. The purpose of this is to evaluate whether and 
how MiFID has affected different dimensions of liquidity. As equation 3.2 shows, the DiD is 
essentially an estimation of the changes in the response variable for the control and treatment 
group before and after the treatment. The first term in the equation computes the liquidity 
change pre and post treatment. The second term estimates the same change, but for the control 
group which does not receive the treatment (MiFID). The difference in the change (difference) 
is thus the DiD estimator: The greater the DiD, the greater the change in liquidity from the 
treatment. In order to evaluate the statistical significance level of the DiD estimator, we will 
be using the DiD estimator as an explanatory variable within the OLS framework (3.1) 
(Pischke, 2019).  
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O!' =	P' +	?! + 	/L4L!' + Q1! 	+ 	2!'    (3.3) 
In equation 3.3, O!' is the outcome variable (liquidity metric), P' as the time-fixed effects and 
?! is the security-specific effects. L4L!' represents the treatment indicator (dummy variable), 
which takes the value of 1 if the security i is treated at time t. The significance level is derived 
from the estimation of /, which represents the effect the MiFID has on stock liquidity. 
Furthermore, the vector of observable security-specific characteristics are the explanatory 
variables, 1!. Lastly, the undefined variables will be expressed through the error term, 2!'.  
When using a DiD estimator as an explanatory variable, one solution is to estimate a dummy 
which identifies all four dimensions (pre, post, treatment, and control). As equation 3.4 shows, 
whether MiFID has been implemented is defined as a dummy based on the implementation 
date (1
st
 of November 2007).  
R4STL: 1 = VD8:=	01.11.2007, 0 = [:DA=:	01.11.2007    (3.4) 
 
Furthermore, whether the security is within the treatment or the control group can be defined 
by using the index variable, which is shown in equation 3.5. We will be using a matched 
control group, which essentially is the US S&P 500 but matched by using the observable 
covariates. When defining the control group, we will also be using a dummy.  
T>7:E: 1 = R;8?ℎ:7	G=:;89:>8	\=A6H, 0 = R;8?ℎ:7	@A>8=AF	\=A6H (3.5) 
 
In summary, the DiD estimator (3.6) is defined as a dummy variable which represents both of 
the dummy variables mentioned above. The product of these two dummies is thus the DiD 
estimator (Wooldridge, 2007). Given that both criteria of the DiD are fulfilled, namely if the 
date is after 1
st
 of November (D = 1) and the security is within the treatment group, the DiD is 
equal to 1 (1 × 1 = 1). 
L4L = L(R4STL) 	× 	L(T>7:E)       (3.6) 
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When performing the DiD analysis, we will as mentioned use the OLS framework with the 
liquidity measurement metrics as the dependent variable. More specifically, we will use the 
DiD dummy, index, MiFID and control variables (q!) to isolate the effect transparency has on 
market liquidity (3.7).  
. = 	/& +	/%L4L! +	/"T>7:E! + /6R4STL! +	/gq! 	+ 	2!'   (3.7) 
3.2.1 Interpreting the DiD Analysis 
Given that the introduction of MiFID – and thus increased transparency – has a causal effect 
on liquidity, this would be expressed through the DiD coefficient. By using the DiD model to 
map the hypotheses stated earlier, we are able to identify possible causal relationships between 
increased transparency, mechanisms and the effect on liquidity. The DiD estimator will thus 




In this section of the thesis we will present the variables which will be used to perform the 
empirical analysis through the methods presented in section 3. Firstly, we will present the 
dependent variables which will be used to measure market liquidity. Secondly, we will 
introduce the explanatory variables which will be used to estimate liquidity. These variables 
will be calculated for a treatment group and a control group. Consequently, we will also 
present the method for sampling the dataset.  
4.1 Dependent Variables 
As mentioned in the literature review, liquidity is complex and multifaceted. Inspired by Sarr 
and Lybek (2002), we will use the five distinct characteristics of a liquid market; tightness, 
immediacy, depth, breadth and resiliency. As our four supplementary hypotheses show, the 
complexity of liquidity implies that some dimensions of stock liquidity may decrease while 
others increase. By using the five dimensions of market liquidity, we are better able to capture 
the effect transparency has on the different dimensions of stock market liquidity. In this section 
of the thesis, we will present measurable dimension-specific liquidity metrics, followed by a 
summary of these dependent variables.  
4.1.1 Tightness 
Of the many liquidity measures presented by Sarr and Lybek (2002), one of the simplest and 
most common liquidity measures is the bid-ask spread. According to the authors, the bid-ask 
spread reflects order-processing costs, asymmetric information costs, inventory-carrying 
costs, and oligopolistic market structure costs. In addition, the bid and ask prices are available 
for most investors and reflects the highest price an investor is willing to pay for a security and 
the lowest price a seller would sell the security, respectively.  
We will in this thesis be using the absolute value of the bid-ask spread (3.8), as the goal is to 
measure the changes in the size and not the direction of the spread. However, it is reasonable 
to believe that a high stock price often yields a higher absolute spread compared to a low stock 
price. The percentage spread adjusts for the fact that a given spread will be less costly for 
higher priced stocks (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). This is done by dividing the bid-ask spread by the 
respective stock closing price (3.9). Here, PA is the ask price and PB is the bid price.   
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     (3.9) 
Bid-Ask-Spread Percentage 
When measuring tightness, we will be using the bid-ask-spread percentage. In order to 
calculate the spread percentage, we will be using daily closing, bid and ask prices gathered for 
each security per trading day. This yields a bid-ask-spread percentage value for each stock, 
each trading day. The higher the spread percentage, the lower the market liquidity.  
4.1.2 Immediacy 
Immediacy says something about the market efficiency in terms of how fast new orders can 
be executed (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). A market with poor immediacy is often associated with 
difficulties in executing orders, and often leads to high price movements once the order gets 
executed (Broto & Lamas, 2016). The daily trading range (3.10) is the difference between the 
highest and lowest price of the security within a trading day. For the same reasons we use the 
bid-ask-spread percentage, we will be using the relative daily range, more specifically the 
range relative to the daily closing price (3.11) 




      (3.11)  
Daily Range Percentage 
As a measure of market immediacy, we will be using the daily range percentage (3.11).  This 
is computed using the daily high and low prices in addition to the daily closing price. This 
data is gathered for each security, each trading day. A high daily range percentage indicates 
large intraday price spikes, thus indicating poorer market immediacy.  
4.1.3 Breadth and Depth 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002, p. 11), deep markets “tend to foster breadth since large 
orders can be divided into several smaller orders to minimize the impact on transaction prices”. 
As previously mentioned, depth refers to the abundancy of orders above and below the current 
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trading price (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). The trading volume (3.12) refers to the number of Euros 
that is traded on the different securities, and thus a higher volume is indicative of a deeper and 
more liquid market.  
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K = @6==:>?+	IAF69:	8=;7:7  
_! = _=4?:	AD	8ℎ:	4	8=;7:	76=4>`	;	<H:?4D4:7	H:=4A7  
e! = e6;>848+	AD	8ℎ:	4	8=;7:	76=4>`	;	<H:?4D4:7	H:=4A7  
  
Sarr and Lybek (2002) note that the measure of trading volume is more informative if it is 
related to the outstanding volume of the respective asset, which implicitly yields the turnover 
rate (3.13). As a liquidity measure, the turnover rate indicates how many times the outstanding 
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In addition to the volume and turnover rates, Lybek and Sarr (2002) suggest the Hui-Heubel 
liquidity ratio as a measure of market breadth. This ratio is calculated as the price impact per 
currency unit of trading volume. As can be seen in the equation for LHH (3.14), the denominator 
is the turnover rate presented above. Assets that are more liquid will have a lower Hui-Heubel 
liquidity ratio than less liquid assets (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). The authors also note that other 
volume measures may be used in the denominator depending on data availability. In this thesis, 
we will be using the volume to measure the depth of the market, while using the Hui-Heubel 






         (3.14) 
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Volume and the Hui-Heubel Liquidity Ratio 
The volume can be directly extracted from Eikon and does therefore not require any further 
computation. For the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio, we will be computing the metric by using the 
highest and lowest closing prices during a window of five days. Furthermore, we will be using 
the volume, the number of shares outstanding and the average closing price for the five 
consecutive trading days.  
The calculation of the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio is done in R by defining the dataset as groups 
of trading weeks (5 trading days) for each individual stock. This liquidity ratio will therefore 
be computed once every week and returns one ratio for each stock each trading week. For 
volume, the liquidity metric is withdrawn for each stock per trading day.  
4.1.4 Resiliency 
Volume and prices often fluctuate heavily around the time where new relevant market 
information is released (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). Bernstein (1987) argues that 
“measures of liquidity when no information is hitting a stock must be more relevant than 
measures of liquidity when new information leads to new equilibrium values”. Hasbrouck and 
Schwartz’s (1988) Market Efficiency Coefficient (MEC) states that price movements are 
continuous in liquid markets, and thus permanent price changes in the instrument should lead 
to minimal movements in a resilient market (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). As equation 3.15 shows, 
the coefficient measures liquidity by comparing short- and long-period volatility in 







        (3.15) 
Here, T is the number of short periods in each long period, while Var(RS) and Var(RL) are 
short- and long-period log return variances, respectively. According to Bernstein (1987), the 
short-term price action tends to be more random as there is no new information hitting the 
stock, while longer-term price fluctuations tend to be information driven as new information 
changes the equilibrium value of the stock. By comparing long and short-period variances, the 
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Market Efficiency Coefficient deals with the separation between liquidity when new 
information is hitting the stock and liquidity when there is no new information (Bernstein, 
1987). 
According to Sarr and Lybek (2002), resilient markets tend to have a Market Efficiency 
Coefficient close to but slightly below the value one, as some unexplained short-term volatility 
is still expected. For a less resilient market however, the volatility between periods of different 
equilibrium prices would be greater, yielding a ratio substantially below one (Sarr & Lybek, 
2002). This is because lower price volatility in general increases price continuity, which in 
other words argues for a more resilient market (Bernstein, 1987). 
Market Efficiency Coefficient 
We will use the Market Efficiency Coefficient to measure market resiliency, using daily log 
return for the short-period volatility and monthly log return for the long-period volatility. We 
are assuming that there are in average 20 trading days each month, and thus the value for T in 
equation 3.15 will be equal to 20. The long-period volatility is constant and equal to the 
monthly volatility, while the short-period volatility is calculated by using a rolling window of 
20 trading days. The ratio will therefore yield one single value for the Market Efficiency 
Coefficient for each stock per trading day.  
4.1.5 General Liquidity Measure 
The previous liquidity measures are chosen to measure the five dimensions of liquidity. In 
addition to the presented metrics, we will also include one metric which measures the overall 
market liquidity. This liquidity measure will thus work as a complementary metric to validate 
the net dimension-specific liquidity effects presented earlier. Amihud (2002) proposes an 
illiquidity measure calculated as the daily ratio of absolute stock return of a stock to its dollar 








'$%        (3.16) 
By comparing the stock’s daily return to the volume over the same period, Amihud´s 
Illiquidity ratio provides a measure of the price impact from one dollar of trading volume 
without the need for microstructure data required by more sophisticated illiquidity measures 
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(Amihud, 2002). This enables the ILLIQ measure to be calculated for long time series data, 
where such microstructure data may not be available (Amihud, 2002). 
Bernstein (1987) argues that to effectively measure liquidity, we must separate between 
market moves caused by noise and those caused by fundamental factors. Market noise is price 
movement caused by random shifts in supply and demand for the security, whereas 
fundamental price shifts are a result of information-driven changes in supply and demand for 
the security (Bernstein, 1987). Bernstein (1987) argues that for the stock market and market 
maker, it is desirable to minimize the impact of the former while allowing the latter to freely 
impact prices. According to the author, a popular measure of liquidity is the ratio of dollar 
volume of trading by the average absolute percentage change in price. This is similar to 
Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio presented earlier. However, a major problem with this measure is 
that trade size has been shown to be uncorrelated with price impact, as demonstrated in Marsh 
and Rock (as cited in Bernstein (1987)). According to Bernstein (1987), this implies that larger 
stocks, where average transaction size tends to be larger, will have a larger ratio even if they 
are no more liquid than a smaller stock. Thus, he argues, the ratio may reflect differences in 
trade sizes rather than liquidity. 
Amihud´s Illiquidity Ratio 
Amihud (2002) suggests that market liquidity can be measured by calculating the average of 
the daily illiquidity ratios for all stocks. Thus, this thesis will use the average daily stock-
specific illiquidity ratio as the measure for general market liquidity. 
4.1.6 Overview of Dependent Variables 
For the analysis, we will use each of the five presented dimension-specific liquidity measures, 
in addition to the general liquidity measure. The data needed to compute the metrics is 
gathered from the Eikon Terminal. Table 2 presents the different metrics´ effect on their 
corresponding liquidity dimensions, and thus also their effect on market liquidity. Amihud´s 




Table 2: Dependent Variables 
The signs presented in column four and six of the table indicate the effect on liquidity from 
each metric increasing or decreasing, respectively. Positive sign refers to increased liquidity, 
while negative indicates decreased liquidity.  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The general level of market liquidity can be expressed through two measures. Firstly, the net 
effect of the five liquidity dimensions may give an indication about the aggregate effect on 
general market liquidity. Secondly, Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio is the chosen measure for 
capturing general market liquidity. The sum of these two methods will thus be used to evaluate 
whether market liquidity increases or decreases. The reason for adding Amihud´s Illiquidity 
ratio is to account for the dimension-specific correlations. As presented in Table 3, the Market 
Efficiency Coefficient (MEC) correlates negatively (-0,52) with the daily range percentage. 
Elaborated, given an increase in the Market Efficiency Coefficient (indicating increased 
resiliency and liquidity), the range is expected to decrease (indicating increased immediacy 
and liquidity). In addition, deep markets tend to foster broad markets (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). 
This correlation is observable through the negative correlation between volume and the Hui-
Heubel liquidity ratio (LHH).  
 
Liquidity Metric Liquidity Dimension Effect on Dimension Effect on Liquidity Effect on Dimension Effect on Liquidity
Bid-Ask Spread Tightness Loose Less Liquid ( - ) Tight More Liquid ( + )
Daily Range Percentage Immediacy Poor Immediacy Less Liquid ( - ) High Immediacy More Liquid ( + )
Hui-Heubel Liquidity Ratio Breadth Broad More Liquid ( + ) Thin Less Liquid ( - )
Volume Depth Deep More Liquid ( + ) Shallow Less Liquid ( - )
Market Efficiency Coefficient Resiliency Resilient More Liquid ( + ) Non-resilient Less Liquid ( - )
Amihud´s Illiquidity Ratio - - Less Liquid ( - ) - More Liquid ( + )
Increase in Metric Decrease in Metric
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
4.2 Explanatory variables 
In this thesis, there are mainly one explanatory variable which is of interest, namely whether 
MiFID has been implemented for the security in question. The other chosen explanatory 
variables seek to capture as many dimensions of a company´s characteristics as possible. 
Inspired by the literature review we will be using some of the control variables which prior 
research has found to be important determinants of market liquidity. In this thesis, we will thus 
be using the company’s industry type, market capitalization, relative company size  and the 
number of days being listed on an exchange. The definition of these control variables can be 
found in the appendix (A2: Explanatory Variables).    
4.3 Treatment and Control Group 
The presented variables will be gathered for a treatment group and a control group. The 
treatment group is defined as the securities which MiFID is implemented on, while the control 
group consist of the securities for which the directive is not implemented. The empirical study 
will separate the measures from the group who receives the treatment and the measures from 
the group who does not. By dividing the data between two separate groups, we are able to 
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compare the post-implementation liquidity levels for the two groups, and thus analyze the 
effect of increased transparency on liquidity.  
4.3.1 Treatment Group 
The purpose of this thesis is to see whether the official MiFID implementation on the 1
st
 of 
November has impacted stock market liquidity in the EU. Thus, the treatment group will be 
comprised of EU stocks, more specifically stocks within the Euro STOXX 600 index. This 
index is derived from STOXX Europe Total Market Index (TMI) and consists of the largest 
600 European companies.  
4.3.2 Control Group 
The control group for the empirical study is comprised of stocks from the US S&P 500 index 
(SPX). This index is comprised of the largest 500 listed companies in the US and is used as 
the counterpart to the European Euro STOXX 600 Index. This is because the Euro STOXX 
600 represents the largest 600 companies within Europe, and the control group should 
therefore also be large in terms of market cap. Furthermore, we consider the US market to be 
the closest peer to the EU market in terms of size and financial market infrastructure. 
However, there is a broad range of factors differing the two indices from each other, which 
may also imply that there are inherent differences in terms of liquidity. For example, firm 
characteristics such as the industry types, the range of firm sizes, and the average firm age 
may differ between the indices. In addition, the National Market Systems (NMS) was 
introduced in the US the same year as MiFID was implemented in the EU (2007). However, a 
report from the European Capital Markets Institute (2007) compared the two regulations and 
argues that the NMS is not a regulation which actively increases market transparency. Thus, 
we expect most of the differences between the two indexes to be due to inherent firm-specific 
characteristics, and that the NMS will not interfere with the estimation of transparency effects 
from MiFID.  
Although the control group accounts for the size and MiFID criteria, the stocks within STOXX 
and S&P itself may be different. Hence, when selecting stocks for the treatment and control 
groups, we may face the problem of selection bias. This is because differences in market 
liquidity in Europe and US after the implementation of MiFID may be due to the differences 
in observable covariates rather than the MiFID regulation (Figure 2). In order to account for 
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these observable covariates, we will perform Nearest Neighbor (NN) Matching by computing 
a propensity score for each security. This is done because the difference between the treated 
and untreated stocks should be minimized (Angrist & Pischke, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 2: Differences in Observable Index-Specific Covariates 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
4.3.3 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Model 
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005), Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is one of 
several popular methods to estimate causal treatment effects. This method is well-suited when 
performing event studies where there is a likelihood for selection bias, and therefore an 
endogeneity problem (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). The PSM model assumes that two 
securities have the same propensity score given the same covariate vector X (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983).  As we are using the US S&P 500 index portfolio as a peer for the European 
Euro STOXX 600, it is reasonable to account for observable covariates which affect stock 
market liquidity. More specifically, the firm-specific characteristics which lies within the two 
portfolios should be accounted for.  
The PSM model seeks to pair two securities which have similar pre-treatment characteristics, 
and from this create an “untreated-proxy” which will act as a control group for the treated 
securities. The proxy should act similarly to the treated security, given that the proxy was 
treated (Pan & Bai, 2021). This enables the empirical analysis to interpret the results in a more 





Xn: Observable EU specific covariates




Figure 3: Propensity Score Matching Process 
When performing the PSM, we will first estimate the propensity scores, which are then used 
in the matching algorithm. After this, the matching quality (assumptions) will be evaluated 
before the final treatment and control groups are presented. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Propensity Score Calculation 
When isolating the MiFID effect, it is important that the treatment group and the control group 
has the same observed covariates. In summary, the propensity score is an estimated value 
which identifies the securities´ observable covariates (characteristics). The propensity score is 
estimated using logistic regression. The logistic regression (3.17) predicts the probability that 
an event occurs, and the propensity score would usually estimate the probability of a stock 
being treated given the observable covariates. This ensures that the subsequent  propensity 
score matching yields groups that are as similar as possible, with the only difference being the 
treatment. This allows for a causal interpretation of the effects of treatment.  
However, the PSM model assumes that the treatment is randomly assigned. In our case, the 
treatment is an EU-specific directive, and the treatment is thus not random but entirely 
dependent on the geographical region where the stock is listed. However, the desired 
circumstances can be artificially created. By adjusting for all characteristics that differ between 
securities in the EU and the US, we alleviate differences stemming from geographical location 
and ensure that the two groups are as similar as possible. Consequently, we would expect the 
stocks in the treatment and control groups to react similarly if both were given the treatment.  
Given two securities with the same covariate vector, the propensity score should be equal for 
both securities, and thus have equal probability of being treated.  In our case, the propensity 
score is essentially an estimation of the probability of a single stock being in the treatment 
group. As only the EU stocks are treated by MiFID, the index variable suits well as the 
response variable. Thus, we will use the logistic regression (3.17) to estimate the probability 
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The logistic regression will be performed by using the “index” variable as the binary variable. 
The binary variable is equal to 1 if stock i is subject to Euro STOXX 600, and the value 0 if it 
is subject to the US S&P 500. We seek to use the observable firm-specific characteristics of 
the companies as the explanatory variables (69). The covariate vector seeks to identify the 
probability of being subject to the European Euro STOXX 600. 
When choosing the explanatory variables for estimating the propensity score, it is important 
to only include variables which influence the outcome variable (propensity score) 
simultaneously (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). The chosen explanatory variables seek to 
capture as many dimensions of a company´s characteristics as possible. In this thesis, we will 
thus be using the company’s industry type (GICS), relative size, market capitalization, and the 
number of days being listed on an exchange.  These explanatory variables will thus be used to 
estimate each security´s propensity score. This is done by using a logistic regression model 
(3.18).  
_& = 	/& +	/%\T@&%:I +	/"&4j:G,J,( + /6T_k!     (3.18) 
GICS: Table 4 shows that each industry is fairly represented in both portfolios, and we 
therefore have a good basis on matching the securities. However, the European securities are 
heavily in the “Industrials”  and “Financials” sector which represents approximately 21 % of 
the securities each, for a total of 42 %. The same sectors only represent 29% of the total number 
of securities within SPX.  
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Table 4: Overview of GICS divided by index 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Size: The size of the firms is a relative percentile computation. Because of the relative size 
categorization, the size variable should not cause any conflict concerning the possibility of 
finding a suitable “match” based on firm size.   
 
Table 5: Overview of company size divided by index 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
IPO: The mean number of days between the official MiFID implementation date and the IPO 
is somewhat similar for both groups. Although there are differences between the values, we 
expect this to have minimal impact. This is supported when comparing the minimum and 
maximum days the security has gone since the IPO.  
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of IPO divided by index 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Matching Algorithm (Nearest Neighbor Matching) 
The propensity score computed in the previous section will be used to match the stock within 
Euro STOXX 600 with the untreated stocks within the US S&P 500. We will be using the 
Nearest Neighbor (NN) matching algorithm in order to perform the matching of propensity 
scores. This method is one of the simplest forms of matching algorithms and performs the 
matching by minimizing the difference between the estimated propensity scores (3.19) (Stuart, 
2010). The treated and untreated securities are both randomly ordered, and the NN model 
matches the first treated security to the untreated security with the lowest corresponding @(_K) 
(Thavaneswaran & Lix, 2008).  
@M_KN = min
K






Figure 4: Nearest Neighbor Matching Method 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Assumptions 
In summary, the propensity score estimated above estimates the probability of a security being 
assigned to the treatment group, conditional on the covariate vector. In our case, this vector is 
a list of observable firm-specific characteristics, namely size, market cap, IPO and GICS. This 
method is based on two assumptions for strong ignorability in the treatment group 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the first assumption states that the treatment z 
and the response variable are conditionally independent given X. This assumption requires 
that the propensity score (response variable) is independent of the treatment (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). The propensity score is in this thesis estimated based on whether a security is 
subject to the European Euro STOXX 600. Since we are controlling for the pre-treatment 
variables, this assumption is considered fulfilled. Furthermore, the assumption also requires 
that the response variable is conditional on the pre-treatment characteristics (Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). We are using four explanatory variables to estimate the propensity score, and 
from TABLE, these explanatory variables are significant on a 10% significance level.  
Treated (Treatment group)
A B C D E F G H
Untreated
A B C D E F G H
PS = 0.89 PS = 0.32 PS = 0.75 PS = 0.67 PS = 0.54 PS = e PS = f PS = g 
PS = 0.76 PS = 0.67 PS = 0.89 PS = 55 PS = a PS = b PS = c PS = d
Untreated (Control group after matching)
A B C D E F G H
Control Dropped Control Control Control Dropped Dropped Dropped
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Table 7: Propensity Score Model 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The second assumption states that there lies a common support between the treatment and 
control group (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), this 
assumption refers to the broad range of available data, and for each explanatory variable X, 
there should be both a treated and untreated observation. As Figure 5 shows, the matched 
control group (Treatment = 0)  and the treatment group (Treatment = 1) seem to have a 
somewhat similar distribution considering the size. 
 
Figure 5: Matched and Unmatched Distribution for Size 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
When looking at different industry types (Figure 6), most of the industries are similarly 
represented within the matched control group (dummy equal to 0), except for the industrial, 
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financial and consumer discretionary sectors. This is expected because of the lack of data for 
these industries within the SPX portfolio. 
 
Figure 6: Matched and Unmatched Distribution for GICS 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
From the density plot for the company age (Figure 7), it is observable that there are fewer 
“old” companies within the treatment group (STOXX). This is expected from the initial table 
of summary for the IPO variable (Table 6). Furthermore, the American securities seem to 
consist of larger companies in terms of market capitalization (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 7: Matched and Unmatched Distribution for IPO 
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Figure 8: Matched and Unmatched Distribution for Market Capitalization 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
A general review of the distribution of the variables indicate that the second assumption is 
fulfilled. seem to be fulfilling the assumption, not a strong and clear conclusion, but enough 
to be able to use the matched control group as a better suited control compared to the raw S&P 
500 index.  
Matched Control Group 
The control group is withdrawn by using the US S&P 500 as basis. This portfolio of 500 
historical constituents is then matched against the treatment group (Euro STOXX 600). The 
matching is performed by using the estimated propensity scores, and by randomly ordering 
the stocks, matching the two portfolios by using the Nearest Neighbor matching method 
without replacement. Because of the lack of data, especially the industry type, the treatment- 
and matched control group decreases in size. More specifically, the sample is reduced to 
consisting of 334 securities within both the control and treatment groups.  
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Table 8: Propensity Score Distribution With and Without Replacement 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The mean propensity score for both methods are different, and both t-tests suggest that there 
is a significant difference in the average propensity score for the treatment and control group 
(B2: Propensity Score (T-test)). The difference in propensity score is lower when allowing for 
replacement (Table 8). We will however perform the matching by restricting replacement in 
order to have a broader dataset, and therefore randomly ordering the securities when 
performing the matching.  
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5. Data Structure 
As MiFID was officially introduced on the 1
st
 of November 2007, we will need the historical 
constituents of the two indexes (STOXX 600 and S&P 500) to capture the directive´s effect 
on stock market liquidity. In practical terms, we will use the constituents for the 1
st
 of January 
2011. This is because the constituents in 2011 have “survived” the financial crisis in 2008. 
Thus, the data sampling would be less affected by missing values, which consequently 
strengthens the initial data sampling. Furthermore, we remove securities from European 
countries not part of the EU in the period from one year prior to and one year after the 
implementation date. This is done as MiFID is an EU directive, and to avoid any complications 
regarding potential special rules applying for countries that are part of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) but not the EU.  
After removing the aforementioned countries, the initial dataset consists of 528 securities from 
STOXX and 500 securities from SPX. The initial raw data is gathered from the Eikon Terminal 
for all 1,028 securities and a daily trading window between the 1
st
 of January 2004 to the 1
st
 
of January 2011. The data consists of 2,629,624 observations for each imported variable (17 
variables excluding computed metrics), which form the fundamental dataset upon which 
further analyses will be performed. The initial dataset is reduced when performing the PSM 
model, resulting in a reduction of 166 securities for the control group and 194 securities for 
the treatment group. Consequently, the PSM model returns a dataset consisting of 668 
securities equally distributed between the two groups (334 securities for each group).  
 




When performing the empirical study, we will sort the group into two periods and two groups. 
This is done because the data can be divided based on two main conditions, namely time and 
index (group). The event study seeks to examine changes following the implementation of 
MiFID, and we will thus be gathering data for 3 years before and after the implementation 
date (1
st
 of November 2007).  
 
Table 10: Summary Statistics for the Initial Sample Divided by Index 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
When computing the metrics, some variables are scaled especially high, while other variables 
measure as low as 10^(-10). In order to interpret the results (coefficients), we scale the 
variables by using a log-transformation (Table 10).  
There are some potential limitations regarding the data sampling of our study. During the 
timeframe of our data sampling (2004 – 2011), the global financial crisis erupted (2007 – 
2008). The financial crisis could naturally be expected to affect stock market liquidity, as many 
companies are likely to be struggling and the financial markets likely experience increased 
volatility and fear. However, a study performed by Halil & Engkuchik (2017) showed that 
there is no causal linkage between four financial crises (the Thai crisis, the Hong Kong crisis, 
the Russian crisis, and the Brazilian crisis) and stock market liquidity. In this thesis, the 
financial crisis is therefore not considered a strong limitation for our empirical study. 
Nevertheless, a potential solution to alleviate any effects from the crisis is to control for the 
year-specific fixed effects by using a categorical control variable for the different years.  
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5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Before performing the empirical analysis, we will present the changes in each liquidity metric, 
split between one week, two weeks, one month, three months, 6 months and 12 months pre 
and post MiFID. The variables are solely based upon the EU securities and thus the treatment 
group. 
 
Table 11: Univariate Analysis 
The table summarizes the changes in liquidity for different periods by measuring the 
difference in liquidity pre and post MiFID (2007-11-01).  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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The univariate analysis (Table 11) supports the hypotheses of a positive liquidity effect of 
increased transparency. Most liquidity variables point in the direction of increased market 
liquidity when measuring the post-treatment variables against the pre-treatment variables. 
However, it is yet hard to distinguish whether the effect is due to MiFID or a general increase 
in market liquidity after 1
st
 of November 2007.  
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6. Results 
In this section, we will interpret the results from the empirical analysis. Furthermore, we will 
evaluate whether the DiD models´ assumptions can be considered as fulfilled, which is critical 
for being able to interpret the results causally. Each method in this section is followed by a 
statistical significance evaluation, while the economic plausibility of the results will be 
presented at the end of this section using the statistical interpretations of each model. For each 
analysis, we perform one regression for each metric, with pre and post treatment windows of 
6 months.  
6.1 OLS Regression 
The OLS Regression (Table 12) is performed upon each of the six liquidity metrics by using 
the historical constituents (528 stocks) of the Euro STOXX 600 index. As Table 12 shows, 
most coefficients seem to be statistically significant. The variable of interest is the dummy 
variable “MiFID”, which is statistically significant at a 1% significance level for each of the 
liquidity metrics.  
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Table 12: OLS Regression ( T= 6 months pre and post MiFID) 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
31.05.2021, 10:55
Side 1 av 4file:///Users/patrickhuangyue/ols6m.htm
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MiFID -0.408*** 0.250*** 0.237*** 0.044*** -0.080*** -1.561***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009)
sizeMedium 0.014 -0.015** 0.275*** -0.097*** 0.085*** 0.0003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.026) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012)
sizeSmall 0.060*** -0.019** 0.003 -0.186*** 0.456*** -0.001
(0.014) (0.009) (0.036) (0.016) (0.032) (0.018)
gicsConsumer Discretionary -0.057*** 0.176*** 0.166*** -0.348*** -0.143*** -0.0001
(0.012) (0.008) (0.032) (0.014) (0.028) (0.015)
gicsConsumer Staples -0.241*** -0.011 0.235*** -0.282*** -0.244*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.035) (0.014) (0.029) (0.016)
gicsEnergy 0.009 0.155*** 0.064* -0.366*** 0.065** -0.001
(0.013) (0.009) (0.034) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017)
gicsFinancials 0.172*** 0.067*** 0.995*** -0.013 -0.846*** 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.027) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
gicsHealth Care -0.131*** 0.056*** 0.573*** 0.116*** -0.472*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.009) (0.035) (0.014) (0.030) (0.017)
gicsIndustrials -0.110*** 0.181*** 0.008 -0.210*** 0.151*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.027) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013)
gicsInformation Technology -0.030** 0.138*** -0.372*** -0.360*** 0.271*** -0.002
(0.015) (0.010) (0.039) (0.017) (0.034) (0.019)
gicsMaterials -0.031*** 0.241*** 0.593*** -0.168*** -0.419*** -0.002
(0.012) (0.008) (0.031) (0.013) (0.027) (0.015)
gicsReal Estate -0.113*** 0.250*** 0.747*** -0.077*** -0.375*** -0.003
(0.017) (0.011) (0.048) (0.020) (0.040) (0.022)
gicsUtilities -0.080*** -0.039*** -0.015 -0.271*** 0.111*** 0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.034) (0.016) (0.029) (0.016)
IPO -0.025*** -0.015*** 0.043*** 0.011*** -0.034*** 0.0003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
mcap 0.089*** -0.051*** 0.139*** -0.369*** 0.966*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
year2008 -0.388*** 0.147*** -0.087*** 0.071*** 0.170*** 0.338***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.020) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
Constant -4.269*** -2.625*** 0.121 1.890*** -7.838*** -14.968***
(0.124) (0.082) (0.327) (0.144) (0.286) (0.159)
Observations 74,503 94,940 80,520 84,674 95,001 30,437
Log Likelihood -74,780.270 -67,432.760 -163,376.700 -102,696.200 -186,729.700 -24,582.260
Akaike Inf. Crit. 149,594.500 134,899.500 326,787.400 205,426.400 373,493.400 49,198.510
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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The question of whether the introduction of MiFID has increased stock market liquidity can 
be answered by observing the coefficient for MiFID. As all the variables are logged, the 
coefficients can be interpreted in percentage terms. As Table 13 shows, all liquidity 
dimensions indicate a reduction in market liquidity. More specifically, the Market Efficiency 
Coefficient decreases by 40,8%, range increases by 25%, the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio 
increases by 23,7 %, the spread increases by 4,4% and the volume decreases by 8%. This 
indicates a looser, shallower and narrower market with lower resiliency and immediacy after 
the MiFID implementation, implying a loss of liquidity.  
 
Table 13: Summary Table for the OLS Regression 
The table summarizes the coefficient signs and presents the corresponding dimension-
specific liquidity effects. An increase (+) in coefficient for the Bid-Ask Spread indicates a 
“Less Liquid (-)” market for the “Tightness” dimension. The Net Liquidity Effect is the 
summary of the five dimensions and shall be read complementary to the ILLIQ variable.  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
On the other hand, the coefficient for Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) is negative, indicating 
that general stock market liquidity has increased. In summary, liquidity as measured by the 
five liquidity dimensions decreases while Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio indicates an increase in 
liquidity. This contradiction highlights the importance of using several different liquidity 
measures, as the effect on liquidity may differ depending on how liquidity is measured. 
However, the OLS regression only measures the difference in liquidity levels pre and post 
treatment for EU stocks. Without a control group, we cannot infer whether the effect is due to 
MiFID or other factors. Due to these considerations, it is difficult to conclusively say whether 
liquidity has increased or decreased, and it is even harder to identify a potential causal 
relationship between increased transparency and liquidity.  
Liquidity Metric MiFID Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension
Bid-Ask Spread + Less Liquid ( - ) Tightness
Daily Range Percentage + Less Liquid ( - ) Immediacy
LHH + Less Liquid ( - ) Breadth
Volume - Less Liquid ( - ) Depth
MEC - Less Liquid ( - ) Resiliency
Net Liquidity Effect Less Liquid ( - )
ILLIQ - More Liquid ( + ) General
OLS Regression
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6.2 Difference-in-Difference  
The DiD model is performed upon the matched treatment and control group, which are 
matched through a pair-to-pair matching as described earlier.  The treatment and control 
groups consist of 334 stocks each. For each stock, we have six dependent variables. The data 
is narrowed down to a period of 6 months pre and post treatment for a total of 12 months. 
Table 14 shows the results from the DiD analysis. The DiD estimator is statistically significant 
for each of the variables. This is similar to the significance of the MiFID coefficient from the 
multiple OLS-regression.  
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Table 14: DiD Regression for Matched Treatment and Control Group 
The variables of interest are the DiD Estimator (DiD), treatment variable (MiFID) and the 
group variable (indexSTOXX). The year-fixed effect is significant for each liquidity metric 
and accounts for potential liquidity changes due to the financial crisis.  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
31.05.2021, 10:47
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Results
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD 0.114*** 0.042*** -0.042*** -0.101*** 0.038*** -2.327***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
MiFID -0.528*** 0.206*** 0.269*** 0.164*** -0.100*** 0.397***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
indexSTOXX -0.186*** 0.049*** -0.257*** 0.183*** 0.013 5.819***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
gicsConsumer
Discretionary -0.172
*** 0.254*** -0.174*** -0.080*** -0.086*** 0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.019) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013)
gicsConsumer
Staples -0.217
*** -0.089*** -0.063*** -0.135*** -0.415*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014)
gicsEnergy -0.032*** 0.254*** 0.234*** 0.032*** -0.352*** -0.0004
(0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014)
gicsFinancials 0.171*** 0.132*** 0.779*** 0.080*** -0.845*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.017) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012)
gicsHealth Care -0.102*** -0.024*** 0.268*** 0.076*** -0.603*** 0.0004
(0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014)
gicsIndustrials -0.182*** 0.167*** 0.060*** -0.036*** -0.375*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012)
gicsInformation
Technology -0.162
*** 0.220*** -0.645*** -0.109*** 0.530*** 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.022) (0.010) (0.020) (0.014)
gicsMaterials -0.094*** 0.229*** 0.399*** -0.039*** -0.461*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014)
gicsReal Estate -0.017 0.292*** 1.068*** 0.211*** -0.811*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.026) (0.013) (0.025) (0.018)
gicsUtilities -0.251*** -0.046*** 0.028 -0.094*** -0.256*** 0.0004
(0.010) (0.007) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014)
sizeMedium -0.066*** 0.068*** -0.221*** 0.315*** -1.017*** -0.0002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
sizeSmall -0.103*** 0.100*** -0.515*** 0.512*** -1.561*** 0.0001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
IPO -0.026*** -0.039*** 0.028*** 0.005*** -0.045*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
year2008 -0.376*** 0.150*** -0.090*** 0.038*** 0.151*** 0.858***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant -1.892*** -3.721*** 4.153*** -7.286*** 15.793*** -20.811***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.035) (0.018) (0.033) (0.024)
Observations 131,767 168,649 148,411 158,890 168,710 61,021
R2 0.285 0.172 0.099 0.104 0.199 0.940
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.172 0.098 0.104 0.199 0.940














Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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As all of the six regressions presented are log-level regressions, the coefficient represents a 
percentage change in the dependent variable. As regression 1 shows, the post-treatment 
Market Efficiency Coefficient increases by approximately 11,4%, significant at the 1% 
significance level. The increase in the Market Efficiency Coefficient implies a decrease in 
short-period volatility relative to long-period volatility, indicating an increase in liquidity in 
the form of higher market resiliency.  
This relationship is supported by three other liquidity dimensions, namely market depth, 
breadth, and tightness. The spread decreases by 10,1% implying a reduction in transaction 
cost, indicating increased market liquidity as measured by tightness. Furthermore, the volume 
increases by 3,8% post-treatment, implying a deeper and more liquid market. In addition, the 
Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio decreases by 4,2% indicating a broader and thus more liquid market. 
Amihud´s illiquidity ratio decreases by 232,7% after the implementation of MiFID for the 
treatment group, suggesting an increase in general market liquidity.  
However, the daily range percentage increases by 4,2 %, significant at the 1% significance 
level. Thus, liquidity as measured by immediacy decreases after the implementation of MiFID. 
The signs of the coefficients are summarized in Table 15. In summary, four out of five 
dimensions as well as the general illiquidity measure suggest an increase in liquidity.  
 
Table 15: Summary Statistics for the 6m Pre and Post Treatment DiD 
Regression 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The DiD analysis indicates that increased transparency causes increased market liquidity on 
aggregate. However, the analysis also shows that an increase in liquidity from one dimension 
may not necessarily imply an increase in other liquidity dimensions.  
Liquidity Metric DiD Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension Significance Level Coefficient
Bid-Ask Spread - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness p < 1% 0,101
Daily Range Percentage + Less Liquid ( - ) Immediacy p < 1% 0,42
LHH - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth p < 1% 0,042
Volume + More Liquid ( + ) Depth p < 1% 0,038
MEC + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency p < 1% 0,114
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )




Table 16: Net Liquidity Effect Applied upon the Four Hypotheses 
The green fields indicate that the liquidity effect from the regression is consistent with the 
expected dimension-specific liquidity effect. Red otherwise.  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 16 summarizes the observed effects from the DiD analysis and compares them to the 
expected effects from our four hypotheses. As the table shows, our findings are highly 
consistent with two mechanisms, namely Market Maker Competition and Trader Adaption. It 
is yet hard to distinguish the effect between the two hypotheses. 
6.2.1 Parallel Trends & Other Assumptions 
In the DiD model, there are several assumptions that need to hold for the results to be 
interpreted as causal (Fredriksson & Magalhaes, 2019). The most important assumption is the 
“parallel trends” assumption (i). In addition to the parallel trends, the DiD model has two other 
assumptions. The stable unit assumption (ii) implies that there are no spill-over effects 
between the control- and treatment groups. If the stable unit assumption does not hold, the 
effect of increased transparency cannot be identified. Furthermore, the model assumes that the 
control variables are exogenous (iii). This implies that the control variables should not be 
affected by whether MiFID has been implemented, as the coefficient would then be biased 
(Rahendran, 2019).  
The latter two assumptions (ii, iii) can be considered as fulfilled. The Stable unit assumption 
assumes that the model equation is correct. In our model equation, we are using firm-specific 
characteristics in addition to the treatment variable, the group variable, and the interaction 
between the latter two variables. The variables can also be considered as exogenous, implying 
that the error term is equal to zero. The exogenous variable assumption is considered fulfilled, 
as our DiD model includes a constant term (Albouy, 2004).  
Liquidity Metric Effect on Liquidity MM Competition MM Freeloading Trader Adaption LO Aversion
Bid-Ask Spread More Liquid ( + ) + - + -
Daily Range Percentage Less Liquid ( - ) ?/+ ? ? ?
LHH More Liquid ( + ) =/+ - =/+ =/-
Volume More Liquid ( + ) + - + -
MEC More Liquid ( + ) + + + -
Net Liquidity Effect Increase Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
DiD Analysis Results Effect on Liquidity´s Five Dimensions
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As mentioned, the parallel trends assumption is the most crucial assumption in order to 
interpret the results as causal. This assumption states that the trends for the control and 
treatment groups are the same before the treatment. The control group is sampled by using the 
PSM model, and firm-specific characteristics are thus accounted for. By using a matched 
control group, the likelihood of fulfilling the parallel trend assumption is higher (Ryan et al. 
2018).  
Several statistical tests have been proposed for evaluating whether the parallel trends 
assumption is fulfilled. However, these methods have received much criticism (Kahn-Lang & 
Lang, 2018). This is because the only group which can be observed as treated is the treatment 
group, and the parallel trends assumption is therefore fundamentally untestable (Fredriksson 
& Magalhaes, 2019). We will therefore be performing a graphical analysis for deciding 
whether the parallel trends assumption holds. When evaluating the pre-treatment trends, we 
are defining the pre-treatment period as the 6 months prior to treatment. The pre-treatment 
period is thus the period from the 1
st
 of May 2007 to the 1
st
 of November 2007. The evaluation 
of the parallel trends assumption will be performed upon each of the liquidity metrics.  
Evaluation of Parallel Trends Assumption 
From appendix (C3: Parallel Trends (Matched STOXX and SPX)), it is observable that some 
of the metrics are fulfilling the parallel trends assumption while other metrics have more 
deviations from what is defined as equally trending time series before the treatment. For the 
Market Efficiency Coefficient and the daily range percentage, the treatment and control groups 
are similar in terms of the level and trends for the whole six-month period prior to treatment. 
Thus, the parallel trends assumption can be considered as fulfilled for the Market Efficiency 
Coefficient and the daily range percentage.  
For the bid-ask spread there is a large initial difference that later converges towards a similar 
level around September 2007. It is thus doubtful whether the parallel trends assumption holds 
for the pre-treatment bid-ask spread. For the volume, both groups experience an initial increase 
followed by a dip from the middle of August 2007. However, the difference between the two 
groups is not constant, as the levels first converge before diverging. Because of these reasons, 
it is doubtful whether the parallel trends assumption holds for the spread and volume. 
For Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio, the pre-treatment levels diverge before later converging 
slightly. It is also noticeable that the difference in level between the groups is larger for this 
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measure than for the previous measures. Although this difference does not reject the 
assumption by itself, it is important to mention that the parallel trends assumption is more 
likely to hold if the levels are similar to begin with (Mckenzie, 2020). For the Hui-Heubel 
liquidity ratio, the trends are initially similar, but later diverge before converging again. Thus, 
it is also doubtful whether the parallel trends assumption holds for Amihud´s Illiquidity Ratio 
and the Hui-Heubel Liquidity Ratio.  
6.3 Staggered Difference-in-Difference  
Although the official implementation date of MiFID is the 1
st
 of November 2007, the actual 
implementation date for several European countries differ from the official date. This might 
be because the directive takes time and affects countries differently. To capture the 
transparency effect on the stock market liquidity, it is therefore important to account for the 
difference in implementation dates (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Summary of the Official Implementation Dates for the Countries 
Represented in this Thesis 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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By performing the DiD model upon the “early” treated country and using the remaining non-
treated EU securities as the control group, we will be able to account for the different 
implementation dates. This requires the use of a Staggered Difference-in-Difference model. 
This model is essentially the regular DiD model, but accounts for multiple treatment dates. 
Table 18 shows two countries of special interest, namely Belgium and Spain. The former 
implemented MiFID on the 1
st
 of July 2006, while the latter implemented it on the 21
st
 of 
December 2007. We will therefore perform a staggered DiD with these two countries in 
addition to the remaining countries which implemented MiFID on the official implementation 
date. 
 
Table 18: Summary of Dates used in the Staggered DiD Analysis 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
6.3.1 Belgium 
Belgium implemented MiFID more than a year prior to the official implementation date. We 
will therefore use the stocks traded within Belgium as the treatment group and use the Belgian 
implementation date (the 1
st
 of July 2006) as a dummy for whether or not the stock has been 
treated. For the control group, we will use two scenarios. The first scenario uses the US stocks 
as the basis for the matched control group, while the second uses the non-treated EU stocks.  
Both cases use the PSM model described earlier to match the securities. The reason for 
performing the DiD with two different control groups is to account for the observable 
covariates which lie within the stock-specific characteristics. It is reasonable to believe that 
the stocks in the Euro STOXX 600 will be a better match for the Belgian securities compared 
to the stocks in SPX. This is because factors such as the implementation of NMS in the US 
can be taken out of consideration when matching Belgian securities against European 
securities. Furthermore, when using the yet non-treated EU securities as the basis for the 
matched control group for Belgium, we can remove other index-specific differences. This is 
likely to improve empirical quality, and thereby the chance of interpretating the results as 
Treatment Group Control Group Treatment (Pre/Post)
Belgium Matched Control Group (SPX) 01.07.2006
Belgium Matched Control Group (STOXX) 01.07.2006
Spain Matched Control Group (SPX) 21.12.2007
STOXX Without Belgium and Spain Matched Control Group (SPX) 01.11.2007
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causal. The results still have country-specific differences, but these are reduced by using 
control variables such as size, GICS, market capitalization and IPO.  
 
Table 19: Propensity Score Table for Belgium 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
From Table 19, the mean propensity scores for the treatment and control group are close for 
both of the scenarios. However, it is noticeable that the p-value from the t-test for mean 
differences increases for the scenario which uses Euro STOXX 600 as the basis for the 
matched control group. This argues for a more precise matching when using the “late” 
implemented European stocks as the basis for the PSM model.  
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Interpretation (Belgium and Europe) 
 
Table 20: DiD Regression for Belgium and European Control Group 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
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Results
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD 0.018 -0.001 -0.059 -0.016 -0.090 -0.053
(0.040) (0.028) (0.073) (0.037) (0.084) (0.084)
MiFID 0.180*** -0.146*** -0.010 -0.043 -0.084 0.846***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.049) (0.027) (0.060) (0.060)
belgium 0.176*** -0.283*** 0.646*** -0.170*** -1.775*** 0.0003
(0.030) (0.021) (0.056) (0.028) (0.064) (0.060)
gicsConsumer
Staples 0.024 0.092
* 0.578*** 0.103 0.018
(0.066) (0.047) (0.059) (0.141) (0.139)
gicsFinancials 1.235*** -0.347*** 2.456*** 0.469*** -2.305*** -0.005
(0.042) (0.030) (0.074) (0.038) (0.089) (0.088)
gicsHealth Care 0.709*** 0.023 -0.513*** 0.261*** 0.177 -0.014
(0.053) (0.038) (0.086) (0.047) (0.113) (0.112)
gicsMaterials 0.601*** 0.304*** -1.079*** 0.071* 0.370*** 0.019
(0.046) (0.033) (0.076) (0.041) (0.098) (0.097)
sizeMedium -0.234*** -0.310*** 1.476*** 0.421*** -2.150*** -0.015
(0.027) (0.019) (0.053) (0.028) (0.057) (0.057)
sizeSmall -0.568*** -0.179*** 0.815*** 1.000*** -2.730*** 0.018
(0.031) (0.022) (0.058) (0.028) (0.065) (0.064)
IPO_bel -0.00003*** 0.00000*** -0.0001*** 0.00002*** 0.00004*** 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant -2.522*** -3.663*** 3.948*** -7.072*** 15.975*** -16.403***
(0.047) (0.033) (0.082) (0.042) (0.099) (0.097)
Observations 5,192 6,518 5,023 5,807 6,552 3,017
R2 0.349 0.200 0.546 0.247 0.414 0.112
Adjusted R2 0.348 0.199 0.545 0.246 0.413 0.109
Residual Std.
Error 0.715 (df = 5181) 0.568 (df = 6507) 1.289 (df = 5013) 0.705 (df = 5796) 1.702 (df = 6541) 1.148 (df = 3006)
F Statistic 277.834
*** (df = 10;
5181)
162.446*** (df = 10;
6507)
669.382*** (df = 9;
5013)
190.187*** (df = 10;
5796)
461.805*** (df = 10;
6541)
37.822*** (df = 10;
3006)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Liquidity Metric DiD Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension Significance Level Coefficient
Bid-Ask Spread - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness p > 10% 0,016
Daily Range Percentage - More Liquid ( + ) Immediacy p > 10% 0,001
LHH - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth p > 10% 0,059
Volume - Less Liquid ( - ) Depth p > 10% 0,090
MEC + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency p > 10% 0,018
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )
ILLIQ - More liquid (+) General p > 10% 0,053
Belgium & STOXX
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When comparing Belgian stocks against the matched stocks within EU, none of the DiD 
coefficients are significant. This implies that for Belgian stocks, the implementation of MiFID 
did not significantly affect liquidity compared to non-treated EU countries. This possibly 
indicates that even though the directive may affect liquidity for the EU market in general, this 
may not apply to all countries. One possible explanation is that countries with less transparent 
and less liquid markets prior to MiFID will experience a greater effect, as the directive induces 
greater changes in these countries´ markets. Thus, if the Belgian market is highly transparent 
and liquid prior to MiFID, the implementation of the directive may not have a significant effect 
on this market. Another possible explanation is that MiFID may have had spillover effects 
before being officially implemented. As the directive was drafted and publicized in 2004, it 
was already known that MiFID would be implemented long before the official implementation 
date. It is thus possible that some markets experienced anticipatory changes to transparency 
or liquidity prior to the official implementation. If the latter explanation is correct, using a 
non-EU control group should yield different results.   
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Interpretation (Belgium and USA) 
 
Table 22: DiD Regression for Belgium and US Control Group 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 23: Summary Statistics for the DiD Regression on Belgium and the 
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Results
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD 0.172*** -0.048* -0.018 -0.106*** -0.036 0.961***
(0.038) (0.026) (0.043) (0.037) (0.059) (0.068)
MiFID 0.027 -0.099*** -0.051* 0.047* -0.138*** -0.168***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.029) (0.026) (0.043) (0.049)
belgium -0.449*** -0.133*** 1.264*** 0.798*** -2.248*** 4.031***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.031) (0.027) (0.043) (0.050)
gicsConsumer
Staples -0.432
*** 0.106** 0.679*** -0.552*** 0.000
(0.060) (0.042) (0.059) (0.095) (0.107)
gicsFinancials 1.041*** -0.325*** 1.614*** 0.238*** -1.936*** 0.000
(0.033) (0.023) (0.035) (0.031) (0.051) (0.058)
gicsHealth Care -0.149*** -0.016 0.479*** 0.463*** -0.618*** -0.000
(0.043) (0.030) (0.045) (0.041) (0.068) (0.077)
gicsMaterials -0.262*** 0.520*** -0.369*** 0.535*** 0.192*** 0.000
(0.042) (0.029) (0.043) (0.040) (0.065) (0.074)
sizeMedium 0.055** -0.228*** -0.024 0.121*** -0.593*** -0.000
(0.025) (0.017) (0.030) (0.026) (0.039) (0.044)
sizeSmall -0.288*** -0.092*** -0.085*** 0.683*** -1.568*** -0.000
(0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.025) (0.041) (0.047)
IPO_bel -0.00004*** 0.00001*** -0.00004*** 0.00001*** 0.00005*** 0.000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant -1.703*** -3.914*** 3.817*** -7.812*** 15.508*** -20.421***
(0.038) (0.027) (0.041) (0.037) (0.060) (0.070)
Observations 5,003 6,295 5,056 6,072 6,327 2,939
R2 0.506 0.214 0.583 0.347 0.610 0.861
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.212 0.583 0.346 0.610 0.860
Residual Std.
Error 0.668 (df = 4992) 0.521 (df = 6284) 0.756 (df = 5046) 0.718 (df = 6061) 1.174 (df = 6316) 0.909 (df = 2928)
F Statistic 510.817
*** (df = 10;
4992)
170.730*** (df = 10;
6284)
784.872*** (df = 9;
5046)
321.765*** (df = 10;
6061)
988.950*** (df = 10;
6316)
1,812.405*** (df = 10;
2928)
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Liquidity Metric DiD Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension Significance Level Coefficient
Bid-Ask Spread - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness p < 1% 0,106
Daily Range Percentage - More Liquid ( + ) Immediacy p > 10% 0,057
LHH - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth p > 10% 0,018
Volume - Less Liquid ( - ) Depth p > 10% 0,036
MEC + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency p < 1% 0,172
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )
ILLIQ + Less Liquid ( - ) General p < 1% 0,961
Belgium & SPX
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When using the US securities as basis for the control group, several liquidity metrics are 
significant. More specifically, the coefficients for the Market Efficiency Coefficient, bid-ask 
spread and Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio are significant at the 1% significance level, while the 
daily range percentage coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level. A narrower 
spread and range in addition to the increased Market Efficiency Coefficient indicate an 
increase in market liquidity, while Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio indicates reduced market 
liquidity. The results also indicate a reduction in volume and the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio, 
but these are not significant. On aggregate, the liquidity dimensions suggest an increase in 
liquidity, while the general liquidity measure suggests the opposite. This may be due to there 
being an actual reduction in volume despite the lack of significance to support this in our 
findings. Alternatively, there may be factors other than the spread increasing the magnitude of 
absolute returns, thus causing an increase in Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio.  
Contrary to the previous DiD regression, these results indicate a significant effect on liquidity. 
If the Belgian market was already transparent and liquid to such a degree that MiFID was 
irrelevant, we would expect the results from using US stocks as a control to still be 
insignificant. As this is not the case, it supports the explanation that the knowledge of MiFID 
may have had effects on EU stock markets before the directive was implemented. This has 
implications for the choice of control group.  Generally, it would be preferable to use EU 
stocks in the control group as the security-specific differences are likely to be smaller than 
when using US stocks as a control. However, if there are spillover effects, there may have 
been gradual changes in transparency and liquidity in the EU control group prior to the 
treatment date. This would make it difficult to isolate the effect of MiFID. Due to the 
likelihood of spillover effects, we will therefore use US stocks for the control group in the 
subsequent analyses.  
6.3.2 Spain 
When performing the DiD analysis on Spain, we will use a matched control group withdrawn 
from the US S&P 500. This is because other EU countries have already implemented MiFID, 
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Results
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD 0.171*** 0.047*** -0.020 -0.006 -0.010 -2.252***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.031) (0.024) (0.035) (0.037)
MiFID -0.273*** -0.191*** 0.613*** 0.262*** -0.421*** 0.550***
(0.060) (0.034) (0.062) (0.048) (0.070) (0.058)
spain -0.197*** -0.043*** -0.918*** 0.122*** 0.827*** 5.608***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
gicsConsumer
Discretionary -0.116
*** 0.267*** -1.052*** 0.347*** -0.628*** -0.001
(0.040) (0.026) (0.048) (0.038) (0.055) (0.057)
gicsConsumer
Staples -0.080
* -0.011 -0.131** 0.379*** -1.798*** -0.006
(0.044) (0.029) (0.052) (0.041) (0.060) (0.062)
gicsEnergy 0.235*** 0.209*** -0.257*** 0.349*** -1.132*** -0.003
(0.042) (0.028) (0.051) (0.040) (0.058) (0.060)
gicsFinancials 0.332*** 0.128*** -0.290*** 0.702*** -0.781*** -0.010
(0.036) (0.024) (0.043) (0.034) (0.049) (0.051)
gicsHealth Care 0.200*** 0.063** -0.350*** 0.677*** -1.249*** -0.005
(0.041) (0.027) (0.049) (0.038) (0.056) (0.057)
gicsIndustrials 0.010 0.227*** 0.273*** 0.371*** -1.635*** -0.002
(0.037) (0.024) (0.045) (0.034) (0.050) (0.052)
gicsInformation
Technology 0.183
*** -0.176*** -0.548*** 0.242*** -1.311*** -0.003
(0.060) (0.039) (0.072) (0.056) (0.083) (0.090)
gicsMaterials -0.161*** 0.462*** -1.199*** 0.438*** -0.175*** -0.002
(0.049) (0.032) (0.059) (0.046) (0.067) (0.070)
gicsUtilities 0.244*** 0.012 0.111** 0.336*** -1.753*** -0.004
(0.037) (0.024) (0.045) (0.035) (0.051) (0.054)
sizeMedium -0.167*** 0.071*** -0.510*** 0.330*** -0.523*** 0.005
(0.017) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.024) (0.025)
sizeSmall -0.206*** 0.172*** -0.242*** 0.334*** -1.509*** 0.006
(0.020) (0.013) (0.024) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028)
IPO_Sp -0.00005*** -0.00000* -0.00004*** -0.00001*** 0.0001*** 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
year2008 -0.403*** 0.417*** -0.434*** -0.153*** 0.411*** 0.873***
(0.059) (0.033) (0.061) (0.047) (0.069) (0.057)
Constant -2.308*** -3.943*** 5.202*** -7.641*** 15.608*** -20.959***
(0.036) (0.024) (0.043) (0.034) (0.050) (0.050)
Observations 11,590 14,749 14,197 14,748 14,749 5,078
R2 0.212 0.121 0.319 0.133 0.391 0.935
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.120 0.318 0.132 0.390 0.935
Residual Std. Error 0.680 (df = 11573) 0.504 (df = 14732) 0.919 (df = 14180) 0.721 (df = 14731) 1.057 (df = 14732) 0.641 (df = 5061)
F Statistic 194.776
*** (df = 16;
11573)
126.169*** (df = 16;
14732)
415.346*** (df = 16;
14180)
140.996*** (df = 16;
14731)




Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 25: Summary Statistics for the DiD Regression on Spain and the US 
Control 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
As with the DiD analysis for Spain and the matched control group, the coefficients for the 
Market Efficiency Coefficient, daily range percentage and Amihud´s Illiquidty ratio are all 
significant at the 1% significance level while the Hui-Heubel liquidity ratio, bid-ask spread 
and volume coefficients are insignificant at 10% significance level. The increased range and 
Market Efficiency Coefficient indicate two contrasting effects, as the former indicates lower 
immediacy while the latter indicates increased resiliency. When isolating the significant 
coefficients, only two dimensions are significant and indicate opposite results. It is thus hard 
to determine whether liquidity has increased or decreased on aggregate. However, when 
including all dimensions, three of five dimensions indicate an increase in liquidity. This result 
is supported by the coefficient for Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio, which decreases by 225,2%, 
significant at the 1 % significance level. This indicates increased general market liquidity.  
As mentioned, Spain was late to implement MiFID compared to other EU countries. Much of 
the EU market would therefore already been affected by MiFID, and it is reasonable to believe 
that this may have had spillover effects to the Spanish market prior to the country’s 
implementation of the directive. Given this, the transparency effect on liquidity may be hard 
to be identify at this point.   
6.3.3 Excluding Belgium and Spain 
The DiD analysis performed on the remaining EU countries is in practice performed similarly 
to the regular DiD model. The reason for using the model again while controlling for Belgium 
and Spain is that we are removing variables which reduce the chance of fulfilling the parallel 
trends assumption. If increased transparency has a significant causal effect on stock market 
liquidity, Belgium could potentially distort the results. The reasoning is that including Belgium 
Liquidity Metric DiD Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension Significance Level Coefficient
Bid-Ask Spread - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness p > 10% 0,006
Daily Range Percentage + Less Liquid ( - ) Immediacy p < 1% 0,047
LHH - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth p > 10% 0,020
Volume - Less Liquid ( - ) Depth p > 10% 0,010
MEC + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency p < 1% 0,171
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )
ILLIQ - More Liquid ( + ) General p < 1% 2,252
Spain & SPX
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may decrease the statistical effect because liquidity for the treatment group is affected before 
the official implementation date. Furthermore, the coefficients would be biased.  
Interpretation 
 
Table 26: DiD Regression for the remaining EU Securities (Excluding 
Belgium & Spain) and the US Control Group 
31.05.2021, 11:56
Side 1 av 1file:///Users/patrickhuangyue/DiDRem.htm
Results
Dependent variable:
MEC range_percentage LHH bid_ask_percentage volume Market_illiq
(Resiliency) (Immediacy) (Breadth) (Tightness) (Depth) (General)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DiD 0.097*** 0.035*** -0.048*** -0.102*** 0.038*** -2.356***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
MiFID -0.538*** 0.215*** 0.278*** 0.163*** -0.098*** 0.290***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
indexSTOXX -0.152*** 0.017*** -0.129*** 0.107*** 0.175*** 5.820***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
gicsConsumer
Discretionary -0.195
*** 0.228*** -0.102*** -0.109*** -0.251*** 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
gicsConsumer
Staples -0.314
*** -0.088*** -0.035*** -0.098*** -0.391*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
gicsEnergy -0.134*** 0.306*** 0.339*** 0.068*** -0.373*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
gicsFinancials 0.069*** 0.186*** 0.702*** 0.091*** -0.622*** -0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
gicsHealth Care -0.184*** 0.047*** 0.228*** 0.101*** -0.485*** 0.0003
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
gicsIndustrials -0.300*** 0.131*** 0.195*** -0.017*** -0.500*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
gicsInformation
Technology -0.250
*** 0.229*** -0.405*** -0.097*** 0.373*** 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
gicsMaterials -0.242*** 0.244*** 0.405*** 0.022*** -0.333*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
gicsReal Estate -0.017 0.320*** 1.036*** 0.181*** -0.608*** -0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.014)
gicsUtilities -0.383*** -0.044*** 0.256*** -0.020** -0.364*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
sizeMedium -0.054*** 0.087*** -0.210*** 0.256*** -0.897*** -0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
sizeSmall -0.103*** 0.111*** -0.596*** 0.461*** -1.344*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
IPO -0.014*** -0.050*** 0.022*** -0.010*** -0.066*** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
year2008 -0.353*** 0.149*** -0.079*** 0.042*** 0.133*** 1.049***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -1.916*** -3.612*** 4.071*** -7.099*** 15.775*** -20.818***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.024) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
Observations 198,406 254,391 233,911 244,151 254,450 95,486
R2 0.300 0.177 0.113 0.091 0.196 0.926
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.177 0.113 0.091 0.196 0.926














Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 27: Summary Statistics of the DiD Analysis for the Remaining 
European Countries 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
As opposed to previous DiD regressions, the coefficients are now statistically significant at 
the 1% level for all liquidity metrics. Increased daily range percentage suggest reduced 
immediacy, and thereby reduced liquidity. However, the coefficients for the spread, Hui-
Heubel liquidity ratio, volume and Market Efficiency Coefficient suggest increased liquidity 
in the form of a tighter, broader, deeper, and more resilient market, respectively. This 
divergence may be due to other factors increasing the daily range. If the increased range is 
accompanied by increased absolute returns, volume may outweigh this effect in the case of 
Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio. When using the five dimensions of liquidity, three out of five 
dimensions indicate higher market liquidity. This is also supported by the reduction in the 
general market liquidity measure. 
6.4 Summary of Staggered DiD 
We have in total presented five DiD analyses, each performed with six liquidity metrics. It is 
therefore pertinent to discuss how the results of different analyses should be weighted. The 
regular DiD model includes two countries which have implemented MiFID on different dates 
compared to most of the European countries in the treatment group. This is accounted for when 
performing the staggered DiD model. Thus, when comparing the sample from the regular DiD 
model to the sample from the staggered DiD model where the differing dates were accounted 
for, the staggered DiD is seemingly a more “correct” model. However, whether the preferred 
DiD model is based upon the sample excluding Belgium and Spain, or one of the samples only 
using Belgium or Spain, is yet hard to distinguish. As Belgium is the first country in the sample 
to implement MiFID, it is also the country best suited for measurements of the effects on 
liquidity. However, by only using Belgium, we are facing a tradeoff between these benefits 
Liquidity Metric DiD Coefficient Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension Significance Level Coefficient
Bid-Ask Spread - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness p < 1% 0,102
Daily Range Percentage + Less Liquid ( - ) Immediacy p < 1% 0,035
LHH - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth p < 1% 0,048
Volume + More Liquid ( + ) Depth p < 1% 0,038
MEC + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency p < 1% 0,097
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )
ILLIQ - More Liquid ( + ) General p < 1% 2,356
Excluding Belgium & Spain
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and the issue of having an adequate sample size. Because of these considerations, each of the 
staggered DiD models will be weighted equally.  
Table 28 presents a summary of each DiD model performed within the Staggered DiD analysis 
where any coefficients were found significant. The bid-ask spread decreases in all the 
significant models, indicating a tighter market with lower transaction costs. The Market 
Efficiency Coefficient increases in all the models, indicating that the short-period volatility is 
more consistent with the long-period volatility thus implying a more resilient market. These 
findings point to increased liquidity. Supporting increased liquidity, volume and the Hui-
Heubel liquidity ratio coefficients are also significant, but only for the DiD model excluding 
Spain and Belgium. These metrics indicates a deeper and broader market respectively. 
Contrary to these findings, the daily range increases in most of the models, indicating reduced 
immediacy. However, this is the only dimension indicating lower liquidity. Because of this, it 
is reasonable to believe that increased transparency has caused an increase in market liquidity. 
This is supported by the decrease in Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio, which indicates a more liquid 
market.  
The mechanisms behind the increase in liquidity are however unclear. We will thus perform a 




Table 28: Summary of the Significant Coefficients 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Liquidity Metric Belgium & SPX Spain & SPX Excluding SPN & BEL Summary Effect on Liquidity Liquidity Dimension
Bid-Ask Spread - Insignificant - - More Liquid ( + ) Tightness
Daily Range Percentage - + + + Less Liquid ( - ) Immediacy
LHH Insignificant Insignificant - - More Liquid ( + ) Breadth
Volume Insignificant Insignificant + + More Liquid ( + ) Depth
MEC + + + + More Liquid ( + ) Resiliency
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + )
ILLIQ + - - - More Liquid ( + )




Table 29: The net liquidity effects summarized for the corresponding 
hypotheses 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
A key goal of the MiFID regulatory framework was to increase transparency in equity markets 
across the EU. This thesis has examined the introduction of MiFID as a “shock” to 
transparency to analyze causal effects of increased transparency on different liquidity 
dimensions. We find evidence for a significant effect on liquidity from the implementation of 
MiFID, implying that market transparency is an important determinant of market liquidity. 
More specifically, we find a significant increase in four out of five liquidity dimensions, with 
only immediacy being negatively affected. Our general measure of market liquidity also 
indicates an increase in liquidity on aggregate. These findings suggest that increased 
transparency causes an increase in liquidity, resulting in a tighter, deeper, broader, and more 
resilient market. However, the findings also suggest that increased transparency may cause 
immediacy to decrease.  
As such, these findings provide evidence for a positive effect from increased transparency on 
the liquidity of equity markets, but that the increased liquidity comes at the expense of a 
reduction in immediacy. These findings are highly consistent with two of our hypotheses, 
namely the Market Maker Competition and Trader Adaption hypotheses. However, as both 
these hypotheses have similar effects on the liquidity dimensions, it is difficult to discern 
which effects may be attributable to each mechanism. Considering that there is a substantial 
focus of MiFID on fostering competition between different trading venues and market makers, 
it is likely that the positive liquidity effects at least partly stem from competition between 
market makers, where spreads are reduced by these actors to attract order flow. The Market 
Maker Competition Hypothesis argues that increased transparency enables the reduction in 
spreads by lowering the risk for market makers, and this benefit is captured by traders due to 
market maker competition. The reduction in spreads is thus the direct response from market 
Liquidity Metric Effect on Liquidity MM Competition MM Freeloading Trader Adaption LO Aversion
Bid-Ask Spread More Liquid ( + ) + - + -
Daily Range Percentage Less Liquid ( - ) ?/+ ? ? ?
LHH More Liquid ( + ) =/+ - =/+ =/-
Volume More Liquid ( + ) + - + -
MEC More Liquid ( + ) + + + -
Net Liquidity Effect More Liquid ( + ) Increase Decrease Increase Decrease
Staggered DiD Analysis Results Effect on Liquidity´s Five Dimensions
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makers to an increase in transparency, while the effects on other dimensions of liquidity in the 
Market Maker Hypothesis are arguably secondary effects. Although we are not able to reach 
a firm conclusion, we argue that these considerations give support to the Market Maker 
Competition Hypothesis as the explanation for the increased tightness observed.  
As mentioned, the positive effects are also highly consistent with the Trader Adaption 
Hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, traders respond to increased transparency by 
reducing their order sizes and more actively managing their orders. This consequently reduces 
their price impact, thereby improving depth, resiliency, and tightness. As such, the primary 
effect of the Trader Adaption Hypothesis is arguably the reduction in price impact stemming 
from smaller order sizes. It is implicit that price impact is dependent on both the order size 
and the spread, and thus a reduction in the average order size is likely to reduce price impact 
even if spreads are held equal. As previously argued, increased depth will often also imply 
increased breadth (Sarr & Lybek, 2002). Once again, we are not able to firmly conclude that 
these mechanisms cause the observed effects. It is however reasonable to expect that each 
group of market participants has its own response to changes in transparency, given that their 
roles in the market differ. By extension, it is reasonable that there is at least one dominant 
mechanism for each of the two groups of market participants, representing the optimal 
response for that group. Considering this, we argue that there is support for the Trader 
Adaption Hypothesis as a likely explanation for the increased breadth and depth observed. The 
increased resiliency is likely to be attributable to both mechanisms, where market maker 
competition mainly narrows spreads and trader adaption mainly reduces average trade size.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the complexity of liquidity measurement, we find 
transparency to have a multifaceted effect on liquidity. We find evidence for a positive 
liquidity effect in which increased transparency leads to a more liquid market. However, we 
find that there is a trade-off, where a more transparent market gains liquidity in the form of 
tightness, breadth, depth, and resiliency at the expense of immediacy.  Based on these findings, 
we argue that transparency has a positive effect on the magnitude of liquidity, but also changes 
the nature of liquidity since different dimensions are unequally affected. This implies that the 
consideration of whether increased transparency is desirable depends on which dimensions of 
liquidity are deemed more important. However, it should be emphasized that the findings are 
subject to uncertainty, particularly as it is doubtful whether the parallel trends assumption is 
fulfilled for some metrics. Furthermore, the discussion regarding which mechanisms explain 
the effects observed is largely an economic interpretation. Although some of our findings 
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support the Market Maker Competition and Trader Adaption hypotheses, they are not 
adequately tested to conclusively say that these mechanisms cause the observed effects. As 
such, a possible avenue for future research is to examine which of the market maker- and 
trader-focused mechanisms have the greatest effect on the different dimensions of liquidity. 
7.1 Limitations 
A major limitation in our analysis is the fact that the treatment (MiFID) is not randomly 
assigned. Although we argue that this problem is mitigated by accounting for firm-specific 
characteristics, it is likely that we have not accounted for all possible characteristics that differ 
between EU and US stocks. The initial sampling can therefore not be considered as good as 
random, and we thus have the potential problem of selection bias.  
Another important limitation is the doubt whether the parallel trends assumption is fulfilled. 
If this assumption does not hold, it restricts the possibility of interpretating the results as 
causal, thus limiting the empirical results found in this thesis. Because of the lack of statistical 
tests to conclusively reject the assumption, we are restricted to only performing a visual 
analysis of the trends to evaluate if they are parallel. The evaluation of whether the assumption 
holds is thus a subjective evaluation. 
In addition, there are two other important limitations, namely the lack of breadth in the 
represented countries and the number of missing values. When performing the staggered DiD 
analysis, it is preferred to have several countries with different implementation dates. In our 
study, we are restricted to only dividing the group into three groups, namely Belgium, Spain, 
and the remaining countries. The optimal solution would be to have different implementation 
dates for more of the EU countries, as this would strengthen the staggered DiD analysis. 
Concerning the data sampling, the sample period is between 2004 and 2011. Because of this, 
the sampling of data for some stocks are missing.  
In this thesis, we have used a six-month period pre and post treatment as our timeframe. We 
have restricted the analysis to this timeframe as this enables us to get a better matched control 
group based on the firm-specific characteristics and a higher likelihood of fulfilling the Parallel 
Trends Assumption. Additionally, given an efficient market, we expect any liquidity effect to 
manifest rather quickly after the implementation of MiFID. However, if there are liquidity 
effects that manifest over a longer time, our analysis may not capture these. Thus, performing 
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the analysis for a timeframe of for example 2 and 4 years before and after the MiFID 
implementation date might reveal additional effects.  
Lastly, we have been interfering with the data by using R to automatically remove the outliers 
for all liquidity metrics, thus removing data in the upper and lower 99
th
 percentiles of our data 
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Appendix A: Data 
A1: Data Structure 
There have been used several data frames in this thesis. This is because we have been 
performing several DiD analyses based on different filters and characteristics. More 
specifically, 5 data frames for 5 DiD analyses; General (EU & USA), Belgium & EU, Belgium 
& USA, Spain & USA, EU excluding Spain and Belgium & USA. These data are used as 
different filters for the same set of variables. The treatment and control group are sampled by 
using the PSM model for the same range of observable security-specific characteristics.  
A2: Explanatory Variables 
Following paragraphs represents the univariate analysis for the treatment group. A descriptive 
evaluation of the directions the liquidity development.  
Bid-ask spread percentage decreases for all periods except for the 2 week pre and 
post measurement. This indicates that the post MiFID stock market has lower transaction costs 
compared to the same period before MiFID. Furthermore indicating a higher market liquidity, 
regarding the tightness dimension.  
Daily Range percentage is decreasing for all periods, indicating a stronger market 
immediacy. Thus, a more liquid stock market. The measurement values for the periods 
between 3 and 12 months pre and post MiFID is however equal, which is the results from 
missing values.  
Volume has increased for each period. A clear indication for a deeper market with 
higher market liquidity. Deep markets tend to foster broad markets, and is supported by an 
increased LHH for the same periods.  
MEC is both decreasing and increasing. Short-term decreases indicating a lower 
resiliency, while increasing in the long-term (3 to 12 months) and referring to a more resilient 
and liquid market.  
ILLIQ have several missing values for the post-MiFID metrics. But has in general 
increased, thus indicating a lower market liquidity.  
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Table 30: Overview of Explanatory Variables 
A3: Dependent Variables 
 
Table 31: Overview of Dependent Variables 
Variable Description Computation Source
MiFID
The Main explanatory variable. 
This indicates whether the current 
observation is pre or past 
treatment.
MiFID = 1: After 01.11.2007
MiFID = 0: Before 01.11.2007
MiFID Report
Index
Index defines whether the 
observation is within STOXX or 
SPX. 
Used as a categorical variable. Eikon Terminal
GICS
The Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) is a four-step 
hierarchical industry classification 
system. 
Using the obove tiered 11 sectors to 
categorize each securities 




The market capitalization of each 
security at 01.11.2007




The relative firm size of each 
security. Computed as the firm 
specific size relative to the 
corresponding index.
 Using the upper, middle and lower 
33,33% percentile of the index 
market cap to identify the respective 
categories: Large, medium and smal. 
Eikon Terminal
IPO
The age and maturity of the 
firms.
Computed as the number of days 
from IPO to MiFID = 1. 
Eikon Terminal
Explanatory Variables
Market Liquidity Metrics Required data Source
Bid-Ask Spread Percentage Bid close
Ask close EIKON - Datastream
Daily Range Percentage Daily High
Daily Low EIKON - Datastream
Volume Volume
EIKON - Datastream
Hui-Heubel´s liquidity ratio Daily High, Daily Low
Volume, VWAP EIKON - Datastream




Amihuds´s Illiquidity Measure Daily close price
Volume EIKON - Datastream
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Appendix B: Matching Algorithm 
We have chosen the Nearest Neighbor (NN) Matching Algorithm to create the treatment and 
control groups. The NN model can either accept “replacement” or “without replacement”. In 
the former case, one security can be matched against several other securities, while in the 
latter, only a one-to-one pair. When allowing for replacements, the model faces a trade-off 
between bias and variance. The quality of the matching increases and bias decreases. Allowing 
for replacement is of “particular interest with data where the propensity score distribution is 
very different in the treatment and the control group” (Caliendo and Kopeinig). However, 
given a somewhat equal distribution of the propensity scores, one should choose a matching 
method without replacement. This method should however be applied upon a randomly 
ordered data (Caliendo and Kopeinig).  
B1: Propensity Score for Matched and Unmatched Sample 
The histogram presents the probability of a stock being assigned to STOXX. The left hand 
side is for the US stocks, while the right hand side is for the EU stocks.  
 
Figure 9: Histogram of the Distribution of Propensity Score 
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B2: Propensity Score (T-test) 
The following tests is a statistical test performed to evaluate the difference in mean propensity 
score. A p value below 5 % can be considered as enough statistical evidence for rejecting the 
null hypothesis: True Difference in means is equal to 0. Given a rejection, one would assume 
that the difference in mean propensity score is statistically different from 0.  
 
 









Appendix C: Difference-in-Difference 
C1: Staggered Difference-in-Difference 
The Staggered DiD is performed by creating date-specific groups. The DiD model is then 
applied upon each of these groups. The interpretation of the different DiD models are therefore 
a relative evaluation based on the number of periods before and after the implementation.  
 
Figure 12: Visualization of Staggered DiD 
C2: Summary of Parallel Trends Evaluations 
The Summary of the Parallel Trends Assumption is presented. The green marks indicate a 
fulfillment of the assumption, while red indicates a rejection of the assumption. Furthermore, 
the yellow fields indicate our doubts for fulfilling the assumption. The graphical presentation 
of the trends can be found in the following sections for Appendix D.  
 























Y-axis: Liquidity measure 
Pre-treatment stock liquidity
Post-treatment stock liquidity
X-axis: Number of days relative to treatment
Y-axis: Liquidity measure 




















C3: Parallel Trends (Matched STOXX and SPX) 
The following plots presents the historical trends for the six liquidity metrics used to evaluate 
the parallel trends assumption. There may be differences in the level of liquidity between the 
European and US markets, but this difference should stay constant between the two groups. 
This is because “observable and unobservable factors may cause the level of the outcome 
variable to differ between the treatment and control” (Fredriksson & Magalhaes, 2019). 
However, as suggested by Kahn-Lane and Lang (2018), the parallel trends assumption is more 
likely to be fulfilled if the pre-treatment levels are more similar. 
 
 




Figure 14: Trend development (Market Efficiency Coefficient & Daily Range 
Percentage) 
 
Figure 15: Trend Development (Bid-Ask Spread Percentage & Volume) 
 
Figure 16: Trend Development (Amihud´s Illiquidity ratio & Hui Heubel 
Liquidity ratio) 
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C4: Parallel Trends (Belgium & Europe) 
 
Figure 17: Summary of the Trend Development for Matched Belgium and 
STOXX 
C5: Parallel Trends (Belgium & US) 
 
Figure 18: Summary of the Trend Development for Matched Belgium and 
SPX 
 88
C6: Parallel Trends (Spain & US) 
 
Figure 19: Summary of the Trend Development for Matched Spain and 
SPX 
C7: Parallel Trends (EU ex. Spain and Belgium & US) 
 
Figure 20: Summary of the Trend Development for Matched STOXX (ex. 
Spain & Belgium) and SPX 
 
 
